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Abstract
Crime Pays:
How Black Americans Became Central to the Carceral State
Will Brooks

Committee members: Dr. Julian Maxwell Hayter, Dr. Thad Williamson, Dr. Pippa Holloway

Over the course of American history, Black Americans have been intentionally criminalized at
moments of ostensible social progress. This legacy of intentional criminalization of minority
communities has both created the perception that African Americans are innately criminal and
given rise to a prison-industrial complex that now depends on Black bodies. Now, predictive
policing technology reinforces perceptions of Black criminality necessary for the justification of
the carceral state and the survival and expansion of the prison-industrial complex.
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Introduction

Every system of control depends for its survival on the tangible and intangible
benefits that are provided to those who are responsible for the system’s
maintenance and administration.1
-

Michelle Alexander

Centuries of discriminatory laws, policies, and practices designed to privilege
White people and disadvantage people of color have resulted in institutions that
produce unequal outcomes even apart from the prejudiced decisions of individual
state agents.2
-

Dorothy Roberts

The preamble to the Constitution of the United States establishes not merely America’s
devotion to justice, but it also agrees to defend the general welfare of the American people. It
promises to “secure the blessing of Liberty” to the living and those yet unborn. Yet, of the
ostensibly free countries around the world, the United States has disproportionately higher
incarceration rates. More bluntly, the United States imprisons more people than any other country
in the free world. Although the U.S. only makes up about 5 percent of the world’s population, that
population comprises nearly 25 percent of the world’s prisoners.3 In thinking about the rise of the
carceral state in the United States, it turns out that history matters.

1

Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New
York: New York Press, 2012), 71.
2
Dorothy Roberts, “Digitizing the Carceral State.” Review of Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile,
Police, and Punish the Poor, by Virginia Eubanks. Harvard Law Review 132, no. 1695 (April 10, 2019): 1708.
Accessed October 3, 2021. https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/1695-1728_Online.pdf
3
Alec Karakatsanis, “The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About ‘Criminal Justice Reform’”, The Yale Law
Journal 128, (March 28, 2019), Accessed October 4, 2021. https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-punishmentbureaucracy.

5

Today, more than two million people in the U.S. are behind bars—the equivalent of about
639 out of every 100,000 people.4 In recent years, according to experts, the American penal system
has transformed into “a set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that encourage
increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the actual need.”5 This system has only recently
expanded—with dreadful results. In 1973, overwhelming evidence led the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals to conclude that “the prison, the reformatory
and the jail have achieved only a shocking record of failure.”6 That failure? The United States
resolved to imprison more people in lieu of mitigating crime. The results are even more clear.
There are upwards of seven-thousand prison or jail facilities in the United States and a growing
number of private, for-profit prisons.7 American incarceration does not stop at these facilities. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that more than four million people are currently under
government control in the form of parole or probation.8
No group of Americans has felt the effects of incarceration more than African Americans—
particularly Black men from impoverished communities. Across the United States, Black men are
six times more likely to be incarcerated compared to their White male counterparts.9 Although
African Americans make up only about 13 percent of the U.S. population, they make up almost 40

4

“Countries with the Most Prisoners 2021,” Statista, 2021, Accessed October 4, 2021.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262961/countries-with-the-most-prisoners/.
“Ranking: Most Prisoners per Capita by Country 2021,” Statista, 2021, Accessed October 4, 2021.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262961/countries-with-the-most-prisoners/.
5
Donna Selman and Paul Leighton, Punishment for Sale: Private Prisons, Big Business, and the Incarceration
Binge, Issues in Crime & Justice. (MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 79.
6
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 8.
7
Peter Wagner and Wendy Sawyer, “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,” Prison Policy Initiative, March 24,
2020, Accessed October 4, 2021. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
8
“Key Statistics: Total Correctional Population,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 11, 2021, Accessed October 4,
2021. https://bjs.ojp.gov/data/key-statistics.
9
“Criminal Justice Facts,” The Sentencing Project, 2022, Accessed October 4, 2021.
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/.
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percent of federal and state inmate populations.10 There is overwhelming evidence that these
institutions are deeply flawed in their ability to either prevent or reduce crime.11 Today, about twothirds of those released from prison are rearrested within three years of release.12
The disproportionate rate of African American imprisonment has historical implications
rooted not entirely in Black criminality, but American racism—namely, policing tactics. The state,
history demonstrates, has reorganized itself to arrest, try, convict, and jail Black people at
disproportionately higher rates than any demographic group in the United States. This process, we
know now, starts with policing. For instance, in New York in 2011, 51 percent of individuals
stopped as part of the city’s ‘stop-and-frisk’ program were African American, while only 9 percent
were White: despite the fact that African Americans made up only 23 percent of the population,
while Whites made up 48 percent.13 Police tactics and criminal justice outcomes shape our
perceptions of the people within the criminal justice system more generally. Criminal justice
expert, Bernard E. Harcourt, argues, “social reality aligns with our carceral and police practices.”14
In other words, the disproportionate targeting of African Americans has led to a more general
belief in Black criminality. In fact, police tactics have given rise to far-reaching views that Black
people are not just dangerous, but inherently criminal. In reality, however, Black criminality is not
pathological—instead, criminality is rooted in historically racist social and economic structures

10
Rebecca C. Hetey and Jennifer L. Eberhardt, “The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves: Racial Disparities and
the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2018,
Accessed October 4, 2021. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0963721418763931.
11
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 8.
12
“Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry,” United States Department of Justice, 2021, Accessed October 9, 2021.
https://www.justice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html.
13
“Stop and frisk” is the practice of stopping an individual on the street based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the
individual is partaking in criminal activity. This practice came to fruition through the 1968 Terry v. Ohio decision.
“2011 NYPD Stop and Frisk Statistics,” Center for Constitutional Rights, Accessed October 9, 2021.
https://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR-Stop-and-Frisk-Fact-Sheet-2011.pdf
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 62.
14
Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 192.
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that have been designed (and redesigned) to put African Americans at a disadvantage, and to
support the interests of those in power. What if Black Americans commit crimes like any other
group of Americans but are disproportionately targeted and demonized for engaging the same
behavior?
Old habits do not die easily—new policing technologies have simply reinforced old beliefs
about the relationship between criminality and people of color. Many police forces now rely on
proactive methods of policing, including hot-spot analysis and person-based predictive algorithms.
Hot-spot analysis refers to the use of historical crime data to predict areas where crime is most
likely to occur. Areas deemed to be crime hot-spots face heightened law enforcement presence as
a result of their designation as a high-risk for crime.15 Person-based predictive algorithms, on the
other hand, are distinguished by their reliance on data related to who is likely to commit a crime.
Data fed into these algorithms include factors such as an individual’s education, income, family
history, and, most importantly, prior criminal history.16 Theoretically, predictive tactics in policing
are thought to be able to identify objective patterns in criminal activity and prevent crime through
tactical intervention.17 In the public eye, hot-spot policing and person-based predictive algorithms
are a progressive development in law enforcement that, ostensibly, are designed to improve
efficiency in crime intervention, and eliminate bias in law enforcement operations.18 In reality,
however, these new tactics are merely an extension of longstanding racist criminal justice
procedures. These predictive methods rely on historically racist criminal justice data to determine

15

Walter L. Perry, Brian McInnis, Carter C. Price, Susan C. Smith, and John S. Hollywood, “Predictive Policing:
The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations”, RAND Corporation research support series,
RAND Corporation, 2013, 19 – 27.
16
Harcourt, Against Prediction, 39 – 109.
17
Perry, et. al., “Predictive Policing,” 4.
18
Brian Jordan Jefferson, “Predictable Policing: Predictive Crime Mapping and Geographies of Policing and Race,”
Annals of the American Association of Geographers, January 2, 2018, Accessed October 4, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2017.1293500.
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where police should patrol and who local law enforcement agencies should target. Instead of
limiting racial bias in law enforcement, these new technological predictive tactics have legitimized
it as an essential aspect of combatting crime.19 Ultimately, this is part of a larger trend whereby
people believe that technological advancements will compensate for and correct human error,
when, in reality, they often reflect human biases.
The result: the United States has transformed into a neoliberal punishment bureaucracy.
Today, police forces are financially incentivized to make arrests and new technologies reinforce
old habits. Over the last several decades, Americans have witnessed multinational corporations
invest billions of dollars into private prisons, police technology and various other parts of the
system.20 Politician’s curry voters’ favor by demonstrating that they are cracking down on crime.
In reality, the data demonstrates that elected officials are merely ensuring a steady flow of revenue
streams toward the country’s penal system. In the end, this process all but ensures that a continuous
supply of Americans end up behind bars each year.21 Millions of jobs across the country have
come to depend on this system.22
As the prison-industrial complex has grown, it is no secret that African Americans have
been—and continue to be—disproportionately affected by this process.23 While some Americans
continue to believe Black criminality is a matter of Black pathology (i.e., African Americans are
innately more prone to poverty and crime), experts hold that rates of African American
incarceration not merely have historical implications, but those implications are a manifestation of

19

Ibid.
Selman and Leighton, Punishment for Sale, 77 – 105.
21
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 1 – 20.
22
Karakatsanis, “The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About ‘Criminal Justice Reform’.”
23
“BOP Statistics: Inmate Statistics,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2021, Accessed October 4, 2021.
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp.
20

9

a ‘broken’ system. 24 Recently, scholars have come to the conclusion that African American crime
is a function of rules and regulations that date back decades, but have grave contemporary
implications. Nowhere is the relationship between Black criminality and people’s perceptions of
it truer than in policing tactics. In fact, the criminal justice system is an industry that, while hidden
to the untrained eye, is a highly efficient system that relies on the criminality of Black and Brown
people to meet its bottom line. In other words, at the same time Americans demonize people of
color for being prone to criminality, they devised a system that cannot, quite ironically, thrive
without criminals.
The historical legacy of incarceration has led to a situation where the industry relies on
Black criminality particularly. The ‘War on Drugs’ intensified perceptions of Black criminality
and has had major economic implications for the prison-industrial complex. Black and Brown
bodies have become increasingly intertwined with the economic interests of those with a stake in
the prison-industrial complex. This is made worse still by new predictive policing strategies that
reinforce not only disproportionate over policing of Black communities, but also the number of
African Americans that end up in prison. By reinforcing biases of African Americans as criminal
through the use of discriminatory tactics, police forces have become justified in providing the
Black and Brown bodies necessary for the perpetuity of our prison-industrial complex. In the end,
Americans have struggled to negotiate the relationship between Black criminality and a system
designed to manufacture it.
****

24

Karakatsanis, “The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About ‘Criminal Justice Reform’.”
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This study seeks to contribute to literature focused on perceptions of minority
criminalization in relation to the interests of the prison-industrial complex.25 Specifically, it
questions how police tactics function to uphold the existing structure of the prison-industrial
complex through the systematic criminalization of African Americans. In answering this question,
this study first integrates theories of racial threat to delineate the history of African American
criminalization and the rise of the carceral state during the Jim Crow and civil rights eras, as well
as its intensification during the War on Drugs.26 Next, it goes on to demonstrate how the carceral
state has given rise to economies that now depend on mass incarceration. Finally, this study
describes the role of predictive policing methods in exacerbating perceptions of African American
criminality and reinforcing the economies that rely on it. While scholars have written extensively
on these subjects, there remains a gap in scholarship connecting predictive policing tactics to the
expansion of the prison-industrial complex through intentional minority criminalization.27 This
study attempts to bridge that gap.
Several bodies of work have explored the history of African American criminality and the
rise of the carceral state. While mass incarceration is a relatively new phenomenon, the systematic
criminalization of African Americans is an age-old practice. At various junctures in U.S. history,
25

Karakatsanis, “The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About ‘Criminal Justice Reform’.”
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 1 – 249.
Harcourt, Against Prediction, 1 – 215.
Selman and Leighton, Punishment for Sale, 1 – 105.
26
Racial threat theories hold that when a minority group poses a threat to a dominant group’s political or economic
influence, dominant groups respond by expanding criminal law to suppress the political and economic power of the
minority.
Scott W. Duxbury, “Who Controls Criminal Law? Racial Threat and the Adoption of State Sentencing Law, 1975 to
2012,” American Sociological Review 86, no. 1, February 1, 2021, Accessed October 5, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122420967647.
27
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 20 – 273.
Harcourt, Against Prediction, 109 – 193.
Selman and Leighton, Punishment for Sale, 1 – 105.
Jefferson, “Predictable Policing: Predictive Crime Mapping and Geographies of Policing and Race.”
“Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities,” Consensus Study Reports, Washington, DC: The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018, 18. https://doi.org/10.17226/24928.
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African Americans have seen ostensible progress. That progress, however, has often been met with
fierce opposition from Whites.28 Indeed, many scholars have found that supposedly objective
criminal laws have been intentionally levied against communities and people of color.29 Not only
is the intentional criminalization of African Americans a recurring theme, but it has also been
found to follow a similar pattern. As described in the documentary The House I Live In,
criminalization of African Americans can be understood as a chain of events. First, they are
identified as a cause for a problem in society. As a result, they become ostracized, making it harder
for them to survive and prosper. In the late 19th century, for example, White Southerners viewed
newly freed Blacks as a threat to the existing economic order, as well as a threat to “rise up and
attack them or rape their women.”30 In other words, they were a problem. As a result, states—
particularly Southern states—adopted ‘Black codes’ as a means to control Blacks through
excessive provision and segregation, making it harder for them to make meaningful progress. With
the help of laws and law enforcement, recently emancipated Black Americans were stripped of
their civil liberties, and were subsequently far more likely to be punished, specifically by
imprisonment (i.e., vagrancy laws that allowed police to send African Americans to jail for not
working).31 This recurring sequence naturally serves to disrupt and destroy African American
communities. At no time in our history has this process been clearer or had a larger impact than
during the War on Drugs.

28

Joseph E. Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and Dorian Tod Warner, Race and American
Political Development. (New York: Routledge, 2008).
29
For example, during the Jim Crow era, police in several states selectively enforced vagrancy laws against African
Americans, making it a criminal offense not to work (but only if you were Black!). Once arrested, African
Americans could again be used as forced labor to fill the pockets of rich White men.
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 31, 95 – 137.
Abiodun Raufu, “Racial Threat Theory and Minorities in the American Criminal Justice System,” European Journal
of Social Sciences Studies 4, no. 6, February 28, 2020, Accessed October 5, 2021.
https://oapub.org/soc/index.php/EJSSS/article/view/744.
30
Ibid., 28.
31
Eugene Jarecki, The House I Live In (United States: Abramorama, 2012).
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Ultimately, this study incorporates and builds on historical research by examining how the
practice of intentionally criminalizing African Americans has given rise to a prison-industrial
complex that now depends on criminality for its own perpetuity. Recently, a growing body of work
has explored the economic function of the prison-industrial complex.32 As incarceration boomed
in the late 20th century, private interests became increasingly at odds with justice and the public
good. During the War on Drugs, the government outsourced several functions of criminal justice
affairs, most notably prison contracts.33 As a result, today, incarceration and corrections are a
multibillion-dollar industry. Several businesses invested in the criminal justice system are publicly
traded companies, including the two largest private prison companies, GEO Group and Corrections
Corporation of America (known today as CoreCivic).34 As Donna Selman and Paul Leighton
contend, “for the businesses involved, the goal is profit; basic free market principles dictate that
companies with shares traded on a stock exchange have the duty to make money for
shareholders.”35 In other words, the criminal justice system has been found to operate as a business
rather than a system to promote the public good. This study explains how private interests of those
involved in the prison-industrial complex have come to rely on Black criminality and perceptions
of it. Through the systematical criminalization of people of color, the prison-industrial complex
has grown so large that it has essentially become an economy in its own right.36 In turn, this
economy now relies Black and Brown bodies to sustain itself. African Americans have become a
currency in a capitalist market dependent on crime and punishment.

32

Selman and Leighton, Punishment for Sale, 1 – 105.
Bernadette Rabuy, Peter Wagner, “Following the Money of Mass Incarceration,” Prison Policy Initiative, January
25, 2017, Accessed October 5, 2021. https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html.
33
Selman and Leighton, Punishment for Sale, 47 – 77.
34
Ibid., 77 – 105.
35
Ibid., 79.
36
Rabuy and Wagner, “Following the Money of Mass Incarceration.”
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As the ‘front line’ of the criminal justice system, so to speak, police forces play a pivotal
role in reinforcing the private interests of the prison-industrial complex. In fact, police forces have
financial interests in the expansion of the prison-industrial complex. For example, civil forfeiture
laws allow police to take property on the mere suspicion that someone is involved in criminal
activity. In the past twenty years alone, police have raked in over sixty-eight billion dollars in
revenue from this practice.37 Scholars have also noted that police forces have nearly unabated
discretion in how they operate.38 Black communities have borne the burden of these tactics. While
many scholars agree that police practices have been impacted by racial bias in the past, there is
much debate over whether or not these biases are still relevant in policing tactics today.39 Some
scholars contend that modern policing methods—namely predictive methods—have done away
with personal bias in policing.40 Hot-spot methods, which use historical crime data to predict areas
where crime is likely to occur, are thought to have shifted police intervention away from certain
groups of people and towards precise locations.41 Furthermore, person-based predictive algorithms
rely on ‘race neutral’ data such as income, education and criminal history to make decisions about
who should be monitored closely for police intervention.42 The data collective inherent to
predictive policing, we know now, does in fact rely on the longstanding practice of over policing
African American communities. What is more, the data simply gives rise to even more

37

“Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture 3rd Edition,” Institute for Justice, 2020, Accessed
October 10, 2021. https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/.
Rabuy and Wagner, “Following the Money of Mass Incarceration.”
38
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 58 – 95.
39
“Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities,” 251 – 303.
40
Jefferson, “Predictable Policing: Predictive Crime Mapping and Geographies of Policing and Race.”
Perry et. al., “Predictive Policing.”
41
Perry et. al., “Predictive Policing,” 1 – 6.
Jefferson, “Predictable Policing: Predictive Crime Mapping and Geographies of Policing and Race.”
42
Roberts, “Digitizing the Carceral State.”
Harcourt, Against Prediction, 39 – 109.
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disproportionate rates of arrest in poor communities of color.43 More bluntly, the data used in
generating predictive methods has been found to be structured by existing racial inequality. This
inequality is then perpetuated through the use of these methods, while being protected by the myth
that data and computer algorithms are innately impartial. 44
In the end, this study seeks to demonstrate that history continues to shape the present. As
long as new-fangled strategies like predictive policing rely on old data and the criminal justice
system continues to rely on bodies of color to meet its bottom-line, there is little incentive to
change. Even more ominously, we must begin to question the differences between our stated
democratic claims and actual practices. Are we, this study asks, a truly democratic society that
upholds constitutional principles, or a country that hides behind the promise of democracy but
behaves like a business?

43

Jefferson, “Predictable Policing: Predictive Crime Mapping and Geographies of Policing and Race.”
“Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities,” 251 – 303.
44
Harcourt, Against Prediction, 109 – 193.
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Chapter I:
A Brief History of African American Criminalization and the Rise of the Carceral State
The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward
slavery.45
-

W.E.B Du Bois

At various junctions in United States history, African American communities were on the verge
of (and have initiated) tangible equality—most notably, perhaps, during the post-Civil War
Reconstruction and mid-twentieth century civil rights eras.46 No two examples, arguably, better
epitomize the promise of real racial progress in America and the backlash against permissiveness.
Despite the potential of these periods to promote a more egalitarian, democratic society, White
Americans fiercely opposed political, social, and economic efforts to improve the lives of African
Americans. Of the countless mechanisms White Americans used to systematically divest African
Americans of their civil liberties, nothing proved more long-lasting the systemic criminalization
of Blackness—by 1890, African Americans represented 12 percent of the U.S. population, but 30
percent of its prisoners.47 This recurring process is one that might be best understood through the
lens of racial threat theories.
Racial threat theory holds that when minority groups pose a threat to dominant groups’
political or economic influence, dominant groups respond by finding ways to suppress the political
and economic power of minorities. This, the theorists hold, is frequently accomplished by

45
William E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: 1860 – 1880, 1. ed. (New York, NY: The Free Press,
1998).
46
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 26 – 48.
47
Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban
America (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 4.

16

expanding or altering criminal law to benefit majority groups. Furthermore, minority groups may
pose a threat to dominant groups by growing in size (or social visibility) and scope, or by the
prospect of increasing their social capital at the expense of dominant groups.48 The process by
which Whites have systematically criminalized African Americans during times of perceived
threat has followed a very similar pattern throughout history. These threats are fundamentally
endeavors into zero-sum politics. Throughout the American South after the Civil War (and beyond
the region, in fact), Whites almost always viewed gains for African Americans as losses for Whites
more broadly. The use of Jim Crow laws to criminalize Black people had grave consequences—
namely, Americans came to associate Blackness with criminality, and, in time, they used law
enforcement to help reorganize the Black labor force. For nearly one-hundred years, Americans
refashioned the legal system to criminalize Black Americans, and Jim Crow laws helped set the
stage for more ominous national trends.

Part I: Reconstruction and the Rise of Black Criminality
Following the American Civil War, the United States entered into what is commonly referred to
as the ‘Reconstruction era.’49 From the beginning, a good number of the enslaved (especially in
places such as Virginia) began to simply walk away from their plantations, undermining the
Confederate labor cause in the process. Southern states quickly came to realize that their economy
and the war effort could no longer function without slave labor.50 By 1863, the enslaved not merely
forced Union officials to think intently about emancipation, but many of them had transformed

48

Ibid.
Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 29-30.
50
Ibid., 28.
49
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into a revolutionary insurgency and this insurgency inspired the nature of Radical Republicanism
after the war. In fact, in the years that followed, Republican officials passed the 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments, extending civil and legal protections to newly emancipated Blacks.51 Each one of
these Amendments set out to break the proverbial shackles of slavery by making recently
emancipated people full-fledged citizens of the United States (by birthright) with voting power.
These amendments met firm resistance.
White Southerners were determined to roll back the gains made by Radical Republicans
and return to some semblance of the Antebellum South. On the one hand, the South made
tremendous progress during Reconstruction: The Freedmen’s Bureau and recently emancipated
people established schools, African Americans forged neighborhoods, and within some of those
spaces, they elected officials to governing bodies throughout the South. These gains, we know
now, were not followed by political will and broad-based support outside of the South. During
reconciliation, as Union troops pulled out of the South and Northern attentions shifted elsewhere,
it became increasingly difficult for Republicans to retain power and enforce Reconstruction.
Southern “Redeemers” used political (i.e., the Democratic Party) and extra-political (e.g., vigilante
violence and terrorism) tactics to reassert control over the region. Groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan, the White League, and the Red Shirts formed and terrorized pro-Reconstruction politicians
and emancipated Blacks.52 The institutionalization of White supremacy, the historical record

51

The 13th Amendment formally abolished slavery.
The 14th Amendment granted citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States”, including former
enslaved persons, and provided all citizens with “equal protection under the laws.”
The 15th Amendment prohibited states from disenfranchising voters “on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
“Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments.” United States Senate. Accessed October
19, 2021. https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm.
52
“Reconstruction vs. Redemption.” The National Endowment for the Humanities, February 11, 2014. Accessed
November 12, 2021. https://www.neh.gov/news/reconstruction-vs-redemption.
“Reconstruction in America: Racial Violence after the Civil War, 1865-1876” Equal Justice Initiative, 2020.
Accessed November 12, 2021. https://eji.org/report/reconstruction-in-america/
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demonstrates, gained significant momentum in the twilight of the nineteenth century. Many White
Southerners, who had all of a sudden found themselves on a relatively equal playing field with
their Black counterparts (i.e., competing for the same jobs and economic opportunities), set out to
build a new, legal racial order.53 When the last federal troops officially withdrew from the South
on April 24, 1877, it ignited an already burgeoning resurgence of democratic rule and White
supremacy.54
In time, ‘Jim Crow’ laws began to dot Southern landscapes over the course of the late
nineteenth century. Of these policies, perhaps the most effective at controlling Black bodies were
vagrancy laws and convict leasing programs. Following the Civil War, several states adopted
vagrancy laws that essentially made it illegal for individuals to be unemployed or move about
freely without proof of employment.55 Once arrested, these individuals could be leased out to
corporations and business owners as ostensibly free labor—a practice that was beyond the
protections afforded by the 13th amendment, which had abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude except as punishment for crimes.56 Moreover, unlike slaves, convicts did not need to be
treated as a capital investment, as there was always prisoners readily available for work. In fact,
Douglas A. Blackmon, the author of the book Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of
Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II, is quoted as saying: “It's impossible to
determine the precise numbers, but in Alabama at least 200,000 African-American men were

53

Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 28.
“Reconstruction in America: Racial Violence after the Civil War, 1865-1876,” Equal Justice Initiative, 2020.
Accessed November 12, 2021. https://eji.org/report/reconstruction-in-america/
55
Risa L. Goluboff and Adam Sorensen. "United States Vagrancy Laws." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
American History. 20 Dec. 2018; Accessed 14 Nov. 2021.
https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e259.
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subjected to the most systematic form of neo slavery, the convict-leasing system. There were tens
of millions of African-Americans that over this 80-year period either one way or another were
forced to live on a farm or in a lumber camp or were forced into convict leasing by the perverted
justice system.”57 Convicts in this system faced dehumanizing conditions, while rich Whites once
again profited from forced African American labor.58 The profitability of this system created an
exceptionally strong demand for a continued supply of prisoners. In a manner that seems eerily
reminiscent of War on Drugs and predictive policing nearly a century later, Americans reorganized
the law to manufacture criminals, and the manufacturing of criminals for labor gave rise to beliefs
about innate Black criminality.59
In time, experts brought their racial biases to bear on this system. Not only did the overtly
racist targeting of African Americans contribute to a wildly disproportionate number of Black
people in the prison system, but it also served to justify Blacks as naturally predisposed to
criminality.60 Contemporary scholars, including Nathaniel Southgate Shaler and Frederick L.
Hoffman, were fascinated with the “Negro problem” that arose with the end of slavery.61 These
men, and other scholars like them, began to use data from trumped up laws to rationalize the
growth of the carceral state. Put another way, Southerners reimagined their legal systems and its
enforcements mechanisms to reorganize the Black labor force after emancipation. Using statistical
analysis of census data created in the years following the Civil War, Hoffman and Shaler argued
that Blacks were undoubtedly more prone to crime than Whites, and made the case that the
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discrepancies were due strictly to a type of Black pathology—disregarding the influence of social
conditions or bias among police and society at large.62 According to Khalil Gibran Muhammad,
“Out of the new methods and data sources, Black criminality would emerge… as a fundamental
measure of Black inferiority.”63 Crime statistics reinforced White-supremacist narratives that
inherent criminality was an essential aspect of the Black race.64 The irony, of course, is that the
historical record demonstrates none of this language prior to the American Civil War—what we
see, in fact, is that the criminalization of Black people rose in conjunction with an economic system
that needed Black people to survive.
American law and American racism, as with slavery, was often a reflection of economic
demands. Hoffman in particular went as far as to compare Black crime statistics to those of White
immigrants (who faced similar economic conditions) to prove the point that there was something
pathologically wrong with Blackness.65 He concluded, Blackness, rather than poverty, gave rise to
increased levels of criminality. These carefully devised narratives worked in terms of connecting
Blackness with criminality.66 By the early twentieth century, more than 26 thousand African
Americans had been incarcerated, and the proportion of African Americans among the prison
population had noticeably increased.67 These statistics reinforced views that free Blacks were a
threat to civil society, and justified punitive policies aimed at controlling them.
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Despite the incredible profitability of convict leasing programs, convict leasing officially
ended in the United States when Alabama became the final state to outlaw the system in 1928.68
The beliefs used to justify this system outlived contract leasing itself, however. Yet, the forces of
restriction found newfangled ways to manufacture free labor, namely through debt peonage and
informal acts of coercion—tactics that went largely unpunished by the criminal justice system. In
1941, however, Attorney General Francis Biddle issued Circular No. 3591, which directed
prosecutors to stop ignoring reports of slavery and involuntary servitude, and to punish those who
failed to abide through criminal procedure.69 In 1948 and 1951, Congress further clarified the law
to leave no doubt that any form of involuntary servitude or slavery was a criminal offense and in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.70 While legislation of this nature extended new legal
protections to African Americans who had been victims of economic coercion, history shows that
the practice of intentionally criminalizing Black bodies outlived the law.

Part II: Black Criminality and the Rise of the War on Drugs
African Americans eventually met the challenges of segregation by organizing their communities
to change Jim Crow laws. Following World War II, again, Blacks Americans re-activated their
communities—who had been organizing against racism since the demise of Reconstruction—
toward civil disobedience and direct-action protest. Through protest and activism, African
Americans and their allies pressured Washington to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965
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Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act.71 The 1964 Civil Rights Act, more broadly,
officially prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nationality.72 The
1965 Voting Rights Act outlawed several discriminatory voting practices that made it difficult for
African Americans to vote—most notably literacy tests that were used as a prerequisite to vote.73
The 1968 Fair Housing Act extended existing legislation related to housing discrimination by
officially prohibiting discrimination regarding the sale, rental, or financing of housing based on
race, color, religion, sex, or nationality.74 This monumental legislation sought to make up for lost
time by lessening the distinctions between America’s stated democratic claims and its actual racist
practices.
In addition to this legislation, Whites and Blacks became increasingly aligned in their calls
for economic reform in the United States—prompting then President Lyndon B. Johnson to declare
a “War on Poverty” in 1964.75 Naturally, Johnson’s War on Poverty was focused on predominantly
Black urban communities where the issues of poverty was most dire.76 However, instead of
focusing on the structural issues that caused poverty, the War on Poverty was aimed at correcting
pathological causes of poverty and crime. According to former U.S. Secretary of Labor Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, poor African American families were trapped in a “tangle of pathology”—
arguing that issues faced by poor Blacks—particularly crime and poverty—were the result of
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unstable Black families and the psychological effects of racism dating back to slavery.77 This wellintentioned yet woefully uninformed way of thinking led the Johnson administration to direct
programs towards correcting Black pathology, while simultaneously avoiding accountability for
underlying structural issues.78
At first glance, the rights revolution of the 1960’s seemed to signify America’s readiness
to finally adopt the egalitarian and democratic values that were more in keeping with the
Reconstruction Amendments. Yet, by the time the ink dried on antipoverty and civil rights
legislation, President Johnson began integrating an anticrime agenda into his War on Poverty—
laying the foundation from a shift to the “War on Crime.”79 Through the 1960’s, intermittent race
riots erupted in predominantly Black urban centers in response to various cases of police brutality
and structural injustice. Instead of taking this context into account, however, policymakers again
focused on Moynihan’s notion of Black pathology. In fact, as it turned out, the continuity of Whites
believing in inherent Black criminality not only survived the civil rights era, but was strengthened
by it. Violence in places such as Los Angeles helped to cement the consensus that crime was, in
general, specific to Black urban youth—with the media presenting Black youths as “public enemy
no. 1.”80 With both crime and poverty presented as essentially an innate part of Black culture,
Johnson moved to fuse the fight against poverty and crime; In his own words Johnson stated:
“Effective law enforcement and social justice must be pursued together, as the foundation of our
efforts against crime.”81 As a result, the modernization of police forces and surveillance tactics
became an essential part of addressing the issues that plagued Black communities. In 1965, Congress
passed the Law Enforcement Assistance Act in response to the racial unrest that occurred in various
urban centers in 1964. According to Elizabeth Hinton, “the punitive legislation offered a response
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to the threat of future disorder by establishing a direct role for the federal government in local police
operations, court systems, and state prisons for the first time in American History.”82

In 1968, the Johnson Administration introduced the Safe Streets Act of 1968, which initiated the
investment of about $400 million into combatting crime.83 Again, this legislation was largely a
response to racial unrest in 1967 and 1968—in 1967, riots erupted in over 150 cities with high
Black populations, and in 1968, violence again swept the nation following the assassination of
Martin Luther King Jr.84 As Johnson’s term ended, it was clear that his War on Poverty was
devolving into an all-out War on Crime—focused in urban ghettos.85
While Johnson set the stage for the shift towards a more punitive approach to Justice,
Richard M. Nixon was the one to capitalize on it. By the late 1960’s Nixon began to take advantage
of many White Americans resistance to the social movements of the 1960s and the perception of
crime that accompanied them. In fact, Nixon rode the wave of ‘law and order’—citing the protests
in urban communities during the ‘long hot summers’ of the 1960’s—all the way to the presidency
in 1968. The rhetoric of law and order championed by Nixon cannot be understated in its
importance as a political tool for election. Richard Nixon won the presidential election by adopting
what is known as the ‘Southern Strategy’, using coded racialized appeals to White southerners
who were resentful of the civil rights movement.86 Nixon played on the growing notion that civil
rights was to blame for increased Black violence—highlighting the ‘lawless’ behavior of civil
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rights activists in an effort to resist many aspects of desegregation, including school
desegregation—an element of his campaign that resonated with poor Whites in particular.87
As president, Nixon accelerated the shift from the War on Poverty to the War on Crime.
Nixon disinvested in Johnson’s anti-poverty programs in favor of strengthening punitive crime
intervention in Black urban communities.88 By this time, the political right had cemented its stance
that lenient social policies were to blame for crime—and that these policies favored undeserving
offenders. They argued that pathologically driven criminals rationally considered the benefits of
committing a crime compared with its potential costs—leading them to commit crime with the
idea that repercussions would be minor. The only solution, they contended, was an ideological
shift away from rehabilitation and towards deterrence through more punitive ‘tough on crime’
measures.89
Importantly, Support for ‘law and order’ and ‘tough on crime’ policies was primarily
driven by disadvantaged Whites, as the increasing notion of Blacks as criminal, once again, gave
Whites a platform in which they could hold superiority over African Americans. In a 1969 speech,
Nixon called on “the silent majority”—referring primarily to conservative, blue-collar, White
Americans who typically stayed out of public discourse—to support his political agenda, and to
embrace order in a time where anti-war and civil rights protests had caused a wave of crime.90
Importantly, the silent majority Nixon was referring to consisted of the same demographic targeted
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by the Southern Strategy. The silent majority speech boosted Nixon’s approval ratings
significantly, and is considered a big reason for his reelection in 1972.91
Nixon’s increasingly punitive approach to the War on Crime evolved to include his
administration’s War on Drugs. Behind the curtain of upholding public safety, however, Nixon’s
War on Drugs was actually used as a means to combat his administration’s main opponents—
antiwar “hippies” and African Americans—and to ultimately get his poll numbers up by appealing
to the popularity of tough on crime ideology.92 According to John Ehrlichman, a top Nixon aide—
“We couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or Blacks, but by getting the public to
associate the hippies with marijuana and Blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily,
we could disrupt those communities.”93 As this revelation makes clear, Nixon’s War on Drugs was
a malicious and well thought out political tactic—it was not designed to reduce drug use or crime,
rather, it was implemented to criminalize and control Nixon’s political opposition.
Arguably, in fact, nowhere was Nixon’s legacy felt more than in his administration’s War
on Drugs. Nixon presented the first call for a War on Drugs as an extension of the ‘law and order’
agenda.94 Declaring drug abuse as “public enemy number one,” Nixon implemented several
policies that reorganized drug crime enforcement. Unlike what came later during the Reagan
administration, Nixon’s legislation contained both punitive and some preventative measures. In
the end, however, many of the provisions in Nixon’s legislation set the stage for caustic
interactions between law enforcement and Black Americans that characterized most of the late
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twentieth century and early twenty-first century. In 1970, Nixon signed the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Title I—"Rehabilitation Programs Relating to Drug
Abuse”—expanded programs and funding designed to rehabilitate drug users. Title II of this act—
the “Controlled Substances Act”—replaced over 50 pieces of drug legislation, and established five
schedules of controlled substances (schedules I, II, III, IV, and V), with schedule I including drugs
considered to have the highest risk for abuse. Schedule I drugs include marijuana, heroin, and
LSD, among others. Nixon also increased to usage of “no-knock” warrants under this title—
allowing law enforcement to enter private property without prior notification.95 Title III of the
act—"Importation and Exportation, Criminal Forfeiture and Drug Law Amendments”—harshened
laws relating to the importation and exportation of controlled substances, and introduced criminal
forfeiture as an essential aspect of drug control. New criminal forfeiture laws allowed law
enforcement agencies to confiscate property involved in criminal activity, including, of course,
drug crime.96 Furthermore, the Nixon administration created the well-known Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), creating a consolidated federal agency to enforce substance laws and regulations.
The creation of the DEA helped to establish the federal government as a primary enforcer of drug
laws—a responsibility that had been historically left to individual states and agencies.97
As this tortured racial history shows, even after the abolition of slavery, United States law
was continually structured to intentionally criminalize African Americans. Following
Reconstruction, Southern states in particular took advantage of obscure laws (i.e., vagrancy laws)
to take away the freedoms that African Americans had been recently afforded. Once they had been
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criminalized by these laws, Blacks could be legally leased to private corporations as free labor.
This system not only served the purpose of reorganizing the African American labor force to
provide free labor once again for White capitalists, but also to re-establish the racial hierarchy that
had been threatened by the gains made during reconstruction.
While new legislation in the mid-20th century effectively eliminated convict leasing as a
practice, the practice of criminalizing Black bodies lived on into the Civil Rights era. Just as
Southern governments capitalized on the sentiment among Whites that Blacks posed a threat to
existing social and economic order during reconstruction, Richard Nixon capitalized on the feeling
that the Civil Rights movement was a threat to Whites. While overtly racist enforcement of the
law was used to criminalize African Americans following Reconstruction, Nixon used ‘law and
order’ rhetoric to paint the Civil Rights movement and its participants as criminal. Moreover,
Nixon introduced his ‘War on Drugs’ in an effort to criminalize African Americans and others
who opposed his stance of the Vietnam War, and to bolster his “tough on crime” stance.
Unsurprisingly, Nixon’s efforts reinforced longstanding perceptions of Black criminality and laid
the foundation for the rise of the carceral state. While Nixon’s War on Drugs was certainly not
good for African American’s, if you can believe, things got demonstrably worse with Reagan and
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
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Chapter II:
Reagan and the Rise of the Prison-Industrial Complex
Now we go on to the next stop: making a final commitment not to tolerate drugs by
anyone, anytime, anyplace. So, won't you join us in this great, new national
crusade?98
-

Nancy Reagan

Part I: Reagan and the Intensification of the War on Drugs
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the Johnson and Nixon administration’s lay the foundation for the rise
of the carceral state by transitioning from a War on Poverty to a War on Crime, and eventually a
War on Drugs. While these administrations played a pivotal role in the rise of mass incarceration,
it was Ronald Reagan who cemented himself as the face of the War on Drugs and the carceral
state, and for good reason. During his presidency, Reagan intensified the carceral state by building
on the policies that aimed to control urban communities through increased policing and
surveillance—drastically increasing the punitive nature of the War on Drugs. When Reagan
officially declared his War on Drugs in October of 1982, evidence suggests that drug usage was
actually on the decline, and drugs were of little concern to the American public.99 Nonetheless,
Reagan moved quickly to place the War on Drugs at the forefront of his agenda—passing
legislation that stiffened and lengthened punishment for drug related offenses. Additionally, Nancy
Reagan launched her “Just Say No” campaign in 1982, bringing more attention to the problem of
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drugs among legislators and the general public. Clearly, the War on Drugs was about far more than
combatting a drug epidemic—it was about politics and control.
Among other things, Reagan introduced the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
which included legislation that mandated longer sentences for many drug-related offenses, largely
eliminated the use of probation and parole in lieu of imprisonment, and made amendments to the
Controlled Substances Act.100 Reagan also took Nixon’s strategy of disinvesting from social
welfare services while subsequently increasing funding for law enforcement. According to
Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness:
Between 1980 and 1984, FBI antidrug funding increased from $8 million to $95 million. Department
of Defense antidrug allocations increased from $33 million in 1981 to $1,042 million in 1991.
During that same period, DEA antidrug spending grew from $86 to $1,026 million, and FBI antidrug
allocations grew from $38 to $181 million. By contrast, funding for agencies responsible for drug
treatment, prevention, and education was dramatically reduced. The budget of the National Institute
on Drug Abuse, for example, was reduced from $274 million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984, and
antidrug funds allocated to the Department of Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million.101

In time, these policies further intensified people’s belief in Black criminality and gave rise to
exponential increases in America’s carceral state. In fact, drug-related conviction during the 1980s
and 1990s led to levels of imprisonment that far eclipsed the Jim Crow era.
When considering Reagan’s massive expansion of the War on Drugs, it is impossible to
separate the increasing support for punitive action from larger socio-economic forces in the
twilight of the twentieth century. Before 1950, African Americans transformed from most rural,
southern populations to an urban, northern (and western) population. In 1900, about 90 percent of
the Black population lived in the South, with a majority in rural areas. By 1970, however, about
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70 percent lived in cities, a majority in the North. For much of the 20th century, African American’s
moved in droves from the South to the urban North in search of economic opportunity.102 In fact,
by 1980, cities such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia had the largest African
American populations in the United States.103 In cities such as these, Blacks were part of the
working poor. African Americans largely relied on manufacturing and other blue-collar industries
for employment due to their general lack of educational attainment—In 1975, only about 25
percent of Black men and 29 percent of Black women older than 25 had four-years of high-school
education.104 In 1970 Detroit, close to one-third of all Blacks employed worked in manufacturing
and heavy industry.105 Over the course of the late 20th century, however, around the same time that
the War on Drugs was gaining momentum, opportunities for legitimate employment were severely
declining in urban centers. Globalization and developments in technology drastically reduced the
number of manufacturing jobs available—from 1979 to 1990, the number of individuals employed
in the manufacturing industry dropped by 1,756,000 people.106 Moreover, while manufacturing
employment was similar between racial and ethnic groups through 1990, by 2007, African
Americans were 15 percent less likely than other groups to have a job in the already depleted
manufacturing industry.107
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Deindustrialization had other implications for urban communities. Middle-class Whites
were continuing the trend of White-flight—moving from cities to predominantly White suburbs.
Corresponding with this trend, employment became increasingly suburbanized and servicebased—According to scholars Aaron J. Howell and Jeffrey M. Timberlake, “between 1970 and
1980 the central cities of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia lost
nearly one million low-skill jobs, while their suburbs gained two million jobs, of which about 40%
were low-skill.”108 Although this data shows that some low skill jobs were still available, the
suburbanization of employment put most jobs out of reach for city dwelling African Americans.
For one thing, the government made it nearly impossible for African Americans to relocate to the
suburbs. Legally sanctioned practices such as racial (exclusionary) zoning and redlining kept
Blacks pinned down in city centers while jobs moved out.109 Moreover, the lack of education
among Black Americans meant that they did not have the necessary skills to compete for jobs in
the globalized, service-based labor market—excluding them from well-paying opportunities that
were afforded to better educated whites.110
The decline of the middle-class in cities also contributed greatly to urban-decay, as massive
reductions in tax-collection impeded investment into infrastructure. Making matters worse, as part
of his budget cuts, Reagan massively reduced federal contributions to city budgets—from 1980 to
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1989 in New York City, state aid was reduced by 20 percent, the equivalent of $4 billion.111 These
economic factors had devastating effects for African Americans in particular—between 1980 and
1990 in Milwaukee, for example, the number of African Americans living in high-poverty ghetto
neighborhoods increased from 25 percent to 55 percent.112 The decline in legitimate employment
among Black communities was certainly recognized among politicians as a dangerous social
condition. When economic resources move out of a given area, people often find new ways to
survive—prohibitive economies not only become viable solutions to underemployment and
unemployment, but they also often directly conflict with the law. Among inner-city Black
communities, the largest market that arose in the 1980s was that of crack cocaine.113 Unfortunately
for African American communities, the decline of meaningful employment opportunities among
low-skill African American workers and the rise of illicit markets coincided with the late 20th
century trend of dealing with social issues through punishment rather than structural reform.
Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of incarcerated African American high school dropout
men, aged twenty to forty, increased from 10.7 percent to a whopping 32.4 percent.114 This drastic
rise in incarceration among the uneducated Black population coincided with the conservative trend
of slashing funding for social services and education; For the fiscal year 1982, for example, Ronald
Reagan proposed budget cuts of over $44 billion—with more than half of this reduction coming
from income security, education, training, employment and social services. Ultimately, this data
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indicates that incarceration rather than socioeconomic reform was the principal way of dealing
with the socioeconomic issues that characterized Black communities.
As Black communities crumbled, Reagan demonized Black communities by making
African American crack users and dealers the face of America’s crime and drug “epidemic.”
During Reagan’s first year of office in 1980, 25.9 percent of households relied on social security
income, and approximately 12.5 percent of the Black population received some sort of public
assistance.115 Throughout his political career, Reagan spoke with disdain for those on welfare—a
sizable amount of whom were African American. Reagan spoke harshly about Black “welfare
queens” who took advantage of government resources—stirring up resentment towards Black
Americans and the United States welfare system.116 Moreover, the media broadcast images of
Black crack addicts all across the nation—evidence of a dire drug scourge among those who relied
on tax-funded welfare checks. Interestingly, research has shown that Whites are actually more
likely to sell drugs than Blacks, and both racial groups use drugs at the same rate. In fact, in 1980,
Whites were 45 percent more likely to sell drugs compared to Blacks.117 Despite the evidence,
African Americans were, and continue to be, disproportionately arrested for drug related crimes.118
Accordingly, Blacks were portrayed as criminals on the news disproportionately compared to their
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actual crime rates, and inner-city African Americans were branded as ‘super predators.’119
Ultimately, the media intensified views of African Americans as part of a dangerous criminal
subculture and increased support for the reduction of federally funded social services—the
problem of drugs was established as a problem not of poverty, but of race.
As the frenzy surrounding the War on Drugs gripped the nation throughout the late
twentieth century, politicians and lawmakers saw an opportunity to push forward increasingly
harsh drug policies. The Reagan administration’s efforts in the War on Drugs culminated with the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which included the infamous 100 – 1 crack to cocaine sentencing
disparity. For sentencing purposes, federal law treated one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to
one-hundred grams of powder cocaine—five grams of crack cocaine carried a mandatory five-year
prison sentence, while it took 500 grams of powder cocaine to carry the same sentence.
Importantly, there is no chemical difference between crack and powder cocaine—the only
difference is that Blacks had been associated with crack, while Whites were associated with
powder cocaine. The act also included asset forfeiture amendments, allowing law enforcement to
use seized assets to fund various expenses.120 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 greatly intensified
the already harsh legislation of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. In 1988,
policymakers revised the act once again to include even harsher penalties for drug offenses,
including new mandatory minimum sentences for first time offenders.121 Quickly, one’s ability to
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prove how tough on crime they could be became a cornerstone of election success for both major
parties—Democrat presidential candidate Bill Clinton adopted the ‘tough on crime’ agenda to get
elected in 1992, and subsequently passed the infamous “three strikes you’re out” law with
bipartisan support.122
While politicians capitalized on the War on Drugs popularity, the war would not have been
a success without the ability of police forces to round up and arrest a huge number of individuals—
particularly people of color. Throughout history, the police have been given the most discretion of
any criminal justice agency, and the War on Drugs was no exception. Police forces have the
discretion to choose both who to target for intervention, as well as where to target this intervention.
Research demonstrates that they used discretion during the War on Drugs similarly to the strategies
devised during the segregation era—that is, it was used to target African Americans and African
American communities.123 By 1990 in New York, 1,558 per 100,000 Black residents age 15 – 64
were in prison, compared to 323 per 100,000 White residents—a discrepancy that continued to
grow until 1999.124 Moreover, across the country in 1989, Blacks were arrested for drug offenses
at a rate of 1,460 people per 100,000, compared to 365 per 100,000 for Whites.125 Between 1991
and 1993, senior statistician for the Bureau of Justice Statistics Patrick A. Langan put this disparity
into context—despite making up 49 and 36 percent of arrests for selling and using drugs, African
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Americans made up only 16 and 13 percent of individuals who reported selling and using drugs
respectively.126
Not only do police forces have the discretion to target African American communities, but
several key judicial precedents have legally protected officers from challenges on the grounds of
racial bias. In the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio, a man named John Terry was stopped and frisked
by police officer Martin McFadden, who suspected that Terry was planning to rob a store. Terry
was found to be holding a pistol, and was subsequently arrested.127 At trial, Terry’s lawyer argued
that the search (or frisk) conducted by the officer violated Terry’s Fourth Amendment right
protecting him from illegal search and seizure. In a landmark 8 – 1 decision, the court sided against
Terry—finding that the search conducted by McFadden did not have to meet the constitutional
standard of probable cause. In the decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared that police officers
have the right to stop, question and even frisk an individual if they have “reasonable suspicion”
that that individual is committing, has committed or will commit a crime.128 This broad notion of
‘reasonable suspicion’ has allowed officers to stop individuals for countless reasons, and
unsurprisingly, African Americans have faced disproportionately negative effects due to this
decision. In fact, one study found that in New York between 2003 and 2011, 84 percent of
pedestrian stops involved African Americans—yet African Americans were less likely to arrested
from these stops.129
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In 1987, McCleskey v. Kemp helped to further protect law enforcement and the criminal
justice system from challenges of racial bias. Warren McCleskey—a Black man sentenced to death
in Georgia for killing a White man, challenged the sentence on grounds of racial bias.130
Supporting his argument was the Baldus study, which found that “defendants charged with killing
White victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants charged with
killing Blacks. Black defendants, like McCleskey, who killed White victims had the highest chance
of being sentenced to death.”131 Nonetheless, the Court ruled that this was not enough to prove
unlawful discrimination—evidence of overt, racial bias would be needed to make this argument.132
This decision—which applied to sentencing decisions in this case—also had major implications
for law enforcement. The McCleskey decision held that any accusations of racial bias by the police
would need to be supported with evidence of overt discrimination—evidence that is extremely
hard to come by particularly when officers can pin their actions on any number of causes for
reasonable suspicion.
On top of all this, police forces also had financial incentives to seize property and make
arrests during the War on Drugs. In 1984, amendments to the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act introduced the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund—used for depositing forfeiture
proceeds for federal agency use.133 Soon after, individual states followed the federal governments
lead, allowing state agencies to reap the proceeds from forfeited assets. Importantly, civil forfeiture
laws require very low standard of proof for asset seizure—while the law differs from state to state,
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civil asset forfeitures do not require a criminal conviction of the owner—assets can be seized with
mere suspicion that they (or the owner) have been involved in a crime.134 Naturally, the prospect
of drastically increasing budgets has led police forces to take advantage of civil forfeiture laws—
In the “Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Statement of Income and Expenses Fiscal
Year 1990” report, the department documented net deposits of just below $460 million from
forfeitures. In fact, from 1985 to 1990, asset seizures grew at an annual rate of 59 percent.135 The
massive funding afforded to police departments through civil forfeiture incentivized police
departments to search for petty crime and seize assets, with the goal of lining their own pockets.
Making matters worse, Reagan’s administration offered up huge cash grants to law
enforcement agencies willing to make drug-enforcement a top priority. As part of the 1988 AntiDrug Abuse Act (amended from the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act), the Edward Byrne Memorial
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program provided massive amounts of funding to
law enforcement agencies in the form of either block or discretionary grants. Between 1989 and
1993, this program allocated over $738 million (approximately 40 percent of funding during this
period) to multijurisdictional task forces—task forces dedicated primarily to the enforcement of
drug laws.136 Funds were used by law enforcement to do things including improve equipment and
training and add personnel to aid in the drug war. According to one study, Byrne grant funding
certainly did its part to increase drug arrests—using weighted least squares regression estimates,
the researchers found that “for every $100 increase in Byrne Grant funding, arrests for drug
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trafficking increased by roughly 22 per 100,000 White residents and by 101 arrests per 100,000
Black residents.”137
With funding directly tied to fighting the War on Drugs and financial incentives for
afforded via civil asset forfeiture, police were given a stake in the perpetual existence of the War
on Drugs. Arrest and incarceration rates soared through the 1980s and 1990s, particularly among
the Black population—from 1980 to 1989 Black arrest rates for drug possession rose 219 percent,
and Black arrest rates for drug sales and manufacturing rose 363 percent. In fact, Between 1980
and 2009, African Americans were arrested at higher rates than all other races across nearly every
category of arrest.138 Instead of seeing this as a deeply rooted social problem, conservatives saw
opportunity—the opportunity to once again profit through the exploitation of Black bodies.

Part II: Privatization and the Rise of the Prison-Industrial Complex
While Ronald Reagan’s policies were hardly a departure from the groundwork laid out by the
administrations before him, his increased emphasis on punitiveness—particularly for drug
crimes—was the tipping point for mass incarceration and the formation of the carceral state.
Increases in police presence and funding improved the efficiency at which arrests could be made,
while factors such as mandatory sentencing minimums ensured that even low-level offenders
would be in jail for extended periods of time. As police forces arrested millions and the criminal
justice system shuffled through the growing prison industrial complex, the carceral state ballooned.
Tough on crime policies that had become essential to political success necessitated having secure
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facilities to house dangerous criminals, but the rate at which people were being incarcerated and
the increased length of sentences was overwhelming prison capacities. By the mid-1980s, prison
overcrowding had become so severe that prisons in a majority of states were under court order to
correct prison conditions due to the fact that current conditions violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.139
Importantly, the War on Crime and the War on Drugs cemented perceptions that prisons
were the only solution to the hyperbolized crime problem in the United States. Conservative
politicians—with assistance from the media—had done an excellent job in stoking fears about
crime and building resentment towards alternative forms of rehabilitation for ‘undeserving’
criminals. Prisons, they argued, were the most effective way to reduce crime, through
incapacitation and deterrence.140 Much evidence, however, suggests that the correlations between
crime and incarceration are not as strong as they are made out to be.141 For one thing, the notion
that increasing incarceration was a response to increases in crime committed was wrong in and of
itself. Instead, increasing rates of incarceration resulted from changes in what people were being
arrested and jailed for. According to scholar and economist Glenn C. Loury— “Between 1980 and
1997 the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent offenses tripled, and the number of people
incarcerated for drug offenses increased by a factor of eleven. Indeed, the criminal-justice
researcher Alfred Blumstein has argued that none of the growth in incarceration between 1980 and
1996 can be attributed to more crime.”142 Moreover, Loury finds that between 1975 and 1999, the
number of convicts increased from 22 per 10,000 to 106 per 10,000 with crime rates held at a
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constant.143 This data indicates that crime was not, in fact, the cause of the prison boom during the
late 20th century. Instead, increased arrests for nonviolent and drug offenses drove the expansion
of the carceral state.
Several scholars have concluded that mass incarceration has had very minimal effect on
reducing crime. From the early 1970s to the mid-2000s, incarceration increased at an exponential
rate.144 If rises in incarceration correlated with decreases in criminal activity, we would expect to
see a steady decrease in crime rates during this period. However, crime rates during this period
fluctuated greatly—evidence that this correlation is not accurate. In fact, even during the 1990s—
a period where high rates of incarceration coincided with a steady decline in crime rates—
incarceration cannot be significantly linked to crime reduction. Through sophisticated empirical
analysis, scholar Bruce Western found that only about 2 to 5 percent of the reduction in crime
through the 1990s could be attributed to the growth in imprisonment.145 This was largely due to
the fact that locking up drug offenders did very little to eliminate crime, increases in incarceration
minimize stigma (and thus the deterrence effect) regarding imprisonment, and the fact that
individuals were more likely to commit crime upon release from prison.146
Nonetheless, with the misguided belief that incarceration was the answer to the exaggerated
crime problem, citizens in the 1980s pushed for more criminals to be arrested and subsequently
jailed. Politicians—needing to appear tough on crime—were determined to find ways to appease
these demands while also solving the problem of prison overcrowding. The simple solution to this
problem seemed to be the construction of more state and federal prisons. Indeed, corrections
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expenditures did increase in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics
data, corrections expenditures increased from about $6 billion in 1979 to just under $40 billion by
1995.147 Yet, this strategy too was quickly becoming a problem. The economic downturn in the
1980s had imposed fiscal restraints on the government, and citizens shot down tax proposals that
would be used to fund prison expansion. For example, as Donna Selman and Paul Leighton note—
“three years after the legislature enacted the 650 Lifer Law, Michigan voters turned down a
proposed tax increase for prisons.”148 It was clear that the United States government would need
balance being tough on crime with fiscal conservatism.
Fortunately for policymakers, at the same time that prison overcrowding was becoming a
major issue, the American public, inspired by Ronald Reagan, was becoming increasingly antigovernment, believing that government spending on generous social programs was the cause of
the economic downturn that characterized the early 1980s. As the economy tumbled in the early
1980s and the public’s trust in the government wavered, Reagan—in his first inaugural address—
stated that “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the
problem.”149 By this, Reagan meant that government spending—particularly on social welfare
programs—was the cause of America’s economic hardship. In turn, Reagan actively worked to
reduce government spending and boost the economy. It was during this time that the
“Reaganomics” model was introduced—cutting taxes for corporations and severely reducing
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spending on social welfare (while also spending more on law enforcement).150 Moreover, along
with reductions in government spending, an increasing number of politicians and economic
theorists had begun advocating for privatization of various government functions. In 1982, Reagan
created the “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control” (commonly known as the “Grace
Commission”), where a panel of private sector executives concluded that the government could
save approximately $424 billion over three years by privatizing various government functions.151
Then, in 1983, the federal Office of Management and Budget established Circular A-76—stating
the following:
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its citizens. The competitive
enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of
national economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the
general policy of the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and services
the Government needs.152

While this ideology favoring privatization was not specifically related to privatizing the prison
industry or the criminal justice system, this sentiment, combined with the prison overcrowding
concerns, set the stage for private prisons and, ultimately, the modern prison-industrial complex.
In 1983, Tom Beasley, Doctor Robert Crants, and Terrell Don Hutto took advantage of
rising prison populations and growing opposition to government programs to found Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA)—known today as CoreCivic.153 CCA was a revolutionary idea at
the time—proposing to design, build and operate prisons and detention facilities for the
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government. Of course, privatizing the prison industry was more complicated and faced more
pushback compared to other government services and industries at the time. Concerns arose from
the notion that law enforcement is an inherently government function, as well as issues about the
cost and quality of private facilities.154 Despite these concerns, privatization of confinement
institutions continued to grow in popularity and scope during the 1980s; By 1988, at least nine
states had private companies operating juvenile detention centers, county prisons, immigration
detention centers and other similar facilities.155 Moreover, in the second President’s Commission
on Privatization in 1987, the panel made several recommendations lending to the idea that
privatization of correctional institutions should be experimented with at the federal level.156 In the
eyes of the commission, private, for-profit prisons could reduce government spending on
incarceration and help deal with prison overcrowding—all while fitting squarely within the allimportant tough on crime agenda. Additionally, private companies like CCA offered the ability to
build prisons using venture capital, credit lines, and stock offerings rather than tax dollars.
Private prisons were also able to take advantage of the socioeconomic factors of the late
20th century. While Black communities felt the worst of the effects of deindustrialization, rural
White communities were also greatly affected. For these regions, prison construction had the allure
of creating new construction and corrections jobs that could benefit their communities. As a result,
rural communities lobbied hard for the construction of prisons in their communities. By the early
1990s, CCA held several government contracts for the operation of corrections facilities, was
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traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and had proved there was plenty of money to be made
in corrections.157

Part III: The Prison-Industrial Complex
On the surface, private prisons seem like an adequate solution to the government’s issues
surrounding incarceration. In reality, however, the introduction of private prisons has left a legacy
where private interests are in constant conflict with justice and rehabilitation. In the past few
decades, the United States has developed a prison-industrial complex—an ‘iron triangle’ in which
government bureaucracy, politicians, and private business interests work together to expand
criminal justice system. As the Critical Resistance organization puts it— “The prison industrial
complex (PIC) is a term we use to describe the overlapping interests of government and industry
that use surveillance, policing, and imprisonment as solutions to economic, social and political
problems.”158 Over the years, the prison-industrial complex has greatly expanded and has gained
unwarranted influence over criminal justice procedures and institutions.
From their conception, private prison companies have treated incarceration as a business
opportunity—a growth sector in a seemingly ever-expanding U.S. economy. The two largest of
these corporations—CoreCivic (formerly CCA) and The GEO Group—are publicly traded
companies (Although they are not the only ones). This means that their main goal is not to deter
crime or rehabilitate offenders, but to maximize shareholder value through the generation of profit.
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Undoubtedly, both companies have been successful at achieving this goal. In 2019, CoreCivic
reported $1,980,690,000 in total revenue, with a net income of $188,890,000.159 In the same year
The GEO Group reported $2,477,922,000 in total revenue and net income of $166,603,000.160
Moreover, some of the most well-known names in the business world have serious stake in these
corporations—BlackRock Fund Advisors and Fidelity Management and Research Corporation are
the two largest investors in CoreCivic at about 29 percent ownership (total value close to $373
million), while the Vanguard Group, Inc. and BlackRock Fund Advisors have a combined 30
percent stake in The GEO Group (total value close to $320 million).161
As of December 31, 2020, CoreCivic operated 47 correctional and detention facilities
(owning 42 of these facilities), and had a design capacity of 70,000 beds.162 The GEO Group
reported operating 118 secure and community-based facilities with 93 thousand beds
worldwide.163 Private prison companies today house close to 10 percent of the U.S. prison
population—and the total number of prisoners housed in these facilities has increased 32 percent
between 2000 and 2019.164 As an industry, private prison companies rely on these beds being filled
in order to make a profit. Private prisons function on per diem payments—receiving a set amount
of money from the government per inmate. With a largely fixed-cost structure, revenue for these
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corporations depends on a steady inflow of inmates to turn a profit. As CoreCivic notes in its SEC
filings— “We are dependent upon the governmental agencies with which we have contracts to
provide offenders for facilities we operate.”165 What is more, private prison companies have
occupancy guarantees built into some contracts. For example, in Colorado, private prisons were
implemented with the intention of housing the overflow prison population. When crime fell by
about 33 percent in 2009, however, CoreCivic (then CCA) negotiated a quota in their contract—
if their facilities were under 90% capacity in the fiscal year 2013, the state would make up the
difference. This occupational guarantee for CCA’s three prison facilities cost the state at least $2
million by mid-year 2013.166
Private prison companies have also been found to profit from disastrous cost-cutting
techniques. As I discussed earlier, private prisons were lauded as a way to reduce government
spending and operate prison services more efficiently. Yet, in reality, this efficiency amounts to
malpractice. To improve profit margins, these corporations hire fewer correctional officers,
provide less training, and invest less in medical care among other cost cutting strategies. The
results of these practices are far from shocking—private prison companies experience high
turnover rates, high rates of violence, and worse health among inmates. In one example, the State
of Ohio sold the Lake Erie Correctional Facility to CoreCivic (CCA at the time) in 2011. CCA
was contracted to manage 1,800 inmates and the deal was designed to save Ohio $3 million per
year. Shortly after receiving the contract, CCA began laying off experienced workers and instituted
pay cuts. With a reduction in staff, violence at the prison flourished— “prisoner-on-prisoner
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assaults increased 188 percent, and prisoner-on-staff assaults increased 306 percent.”167 Clearly,
the concerns raised in the early years of prison privatization regarding quality and accountability
should have been given more thought.
Most disturbingly, perhaps, is that private prisons and companies affiliated with them profit
from prison labor. Programs such as The Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
(PIECP) set criteria that allow prisoners to work—including paying prisoners minimum wage.
While this seems beneficial to both parties at the surface, in reality, prisons abuse loopholes in the
law. For example, the PIECP permits the deduction of wages up to 80 percent for things such as
room and board; In essence, prisoners are paying not only for their stay in prison, but for the
expansion of the prison system all together. Making matters worse, prisons have been known to
severely upcharge on basic necessities such as soap, deodorant, and personal phone calls. Prisoners
are essentially forced to work long hours on miniscule wages in order to afford basic necessities.168
Carceral companies have a massive stake in the continuation of mass incarceration. Despite
claims that they do not advocate for policies related to crime control or the duration of sentences,
these claims are misleading. For one thing, private prison corporations have historically been
involved with powerful organizations that have major influence in shaping criminal justice policy.
Of these organizations, the most infamous is the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).
Despite branding itself as “America’s largest nonpartisan, voluntary membership organization of
state legislators dedicated to the principles of limited government, free markets and federalism”—
in reality, ALEC is a corporate lobby group comprised of conservative politicians and large
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corporations who draft and push for the passage of legislation.169 Historically, conservative
politicians have catered to corporate interests and pushed for pro-business legislation—For
example, in 2017, conservative president Donald Trump cut corporate taxes from 35 percent to 21
percent under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.170 Through ALEC, corporations have been
granted undue influence over politics and the introduction of legislation, and it has had devastating
consequences for mass incarceration and minority communities in particular. In fact, most, if not
all, of the legislation introduced by ALEC has been in the interest of its corporate sponsors—
including CCA. In fact, CCA was one of ALEC’s largest sponsors for nearly two decades, while
also co-chairing ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force for a number of years. ALEC is responsible
for introducing widely adopted legislation such as the ‘three-strikes laws’ and ‘Truth-inSentencing Act’, which required offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. ALEC has
also been a firm advocate of allowing privatization in the criminal justice system—pioneering the
“Private Correctional Facilities Act.” Although CCA is no longer a sponsor of ALEC, these laws
have been pivotal to the success of private prison corporations, as they have played a major role
in increasing the number of people arrested and lengthening sentences. 171
Private prison corporations are also actively involved in lobbying through political
donations—particularly to conservative lawmakers who support strict immigration and punitive
crime policies. In one example, in 2004, CCA donated $100 thousand to Texas Republican and
U.S. House majority leader Tom Delay’s charity. Shortly thereafter, Delay signed a contract with
CCA to manage seven state prisons with capacity of 83 thousand total beds.172 More recently, The
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GEO Group and CoreCivic have donated to President Trump—a well-known supporter of the
tough on crime and anti-immigration policies that these corporations thrive on. Using The GEO
Group as an example, in 2016, they donated a total of $225 thousand to the pro-trump PAC
‘Rebuilding America Now.’ Once elected, not only did the stock price of both CoreCivic and The
GEO Group soar, but The GEO Group was granted a 10-year, $110 million federal contract.173
Today, the prison-industrial complex is responsible for the creation of millions of jobs. The
bureau of labor statistics estimates that over 450 thousand people work as correctional officers and
jailers alone.174 Additionally, there are over 650 thousand police and sheriff’s officers in the United
States.175 Multinational corporations generate massive profits through prison labor. With the help
of ALEC, corporations have been able to sidestep laws that require paying prisoners minimum
wage for their work. Companies such as JC Penny, Whole Foods, Microsoft, and Victoria’s Secret
have generated huge profits from prison labor—eerily reminiscent of the profits generated by
corporations through convict leasing programs. Hundreds of other private corporations generate
massive profits from incarceration; the food service Aramark controls dining services in close to
40 percent of all U.S. prisons, often using prison labor to assist in food preparation, while offering
very low-quality food to improve profit margins (there have been several complaints of maggots
in these meals over the years). As incarceration and criminality has become a growth sector of the
U.S. economy, lobby groups such as ALEC have pushed for even more privatization in the criminal
justice system—including the privatization of probation and parole services. Private companies
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such as Attenti Ltd. sell GPS tracking technology to assist in the surveillance of people on parole.
Police services receive massive amounts of funding to improve their ability to fight crime and fill
prisons—something I will discuss in greater detail in chapters three and four.176
Ultimately, with corporations, politicians, and bureaucratic interests all heavily invested in
the carceral state, the system has evolved into an economy in its own right. Every economy,
however, requires some form of currency, and the currency of the prison-industrial complex is
human bodies—with Black bodies being the most valuable. As this thesis has made clear by this
point, African Americans have long been the target of systematic criminalization and are
disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. Today, African Americans—
particularly those in poverty—offer the path of least resistance for the continuation of the prisonindustrial complex. Inside the invisible walls of urban ghettos, Black communities are targeted by
police task forces with the goal of making seizures and arrests. Lacking social and economic
capital, these communities are easy targets. In fact, over policing of Black communities has
nothing to do with crime itself—although the vast majority of arrests are for drug crimes, at the
height of mass incarceration between 1979 and 2000, White high school seniors reported using
drugs at significantly higher rates compared with Black high school seniors; A study by the
National Survey on Drug Abuse showed that drug use does not differ much between Black and
White adults.177
Not only are African Americans targeted and incarcerated at grossly disproportionate rates,
but this legacy of incarceration perpetuates the social and political issues that lead to incarceration
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in the first place. For convicted felons, gaining meaningful employment is next to impossible—
leading them back to the same illicit activities that got them locked up in the first place. Felony
disenfranchisement laws restrict convicted felons from ever having the right to vote. As of 2007,
Florida and Alabama had permanently disenfranchised nearly a third of all Black men.178
The incredible and deeply rooted injustice of the United States criminal justice system
presented thus far begs a simple question—how can we as a democratic society continue to have
a system dedicated to oppression and restriction of rights? The answer unfortunately lies in
perceptions of Black criminality. Years and years of effort by politicians has painted African
Americans as nothing more than criminals to be dealt with. Because of this, the public has been
slow to recognize the true injustice of the situation.
Fortunately, in recent years, more and more people have been waking up to the injustices
posed by the prison-industrial complex and the criminal justice system. Grassroots movements
such as ‘Black Lives Matter’ has brought greater attention to the plight of Black Americans. Just
because people are opening their eyes, however, does not mean that the system has lost the
incentive to make a profit. Sure, corporations such as GEO Group and CoreCivic have attempted
to rebrand their image, but the simple fact is that they still depend on bodies—particularly Black
bodies—to drive a profit. The system, it appears, is now evolving with the times. Instead of relying
on overtly racist politicians and police practices to reinforce perceptions of Black criminality, those
with a stake in the system have found new ways to advance their interests.
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Chapter III:
Predictive Policing and Perceptions of Black Criminality
‘The unconscious association between Blacks and crime is so powerful that it
supersedes reality’… ‘it predisposes Whites to literally see Black people as
criminals. Their skin color marks Blacks as visibly lawless.’179

-

Dorothy Roberts

Police remain central to the expansion of the carceral state at the expense of minority communities.
Yet, in the past few years in particular, social activists have brought more attention to policing
tactics and injustices committed at the hands of the police. The reemergence of open racism has
piqued newfound interest in the continuity of historical racism and institutionalized aggression
against Black Americans. Indeed, some claim that American racism has not intensified, it is merely
being filmed.180 In 2014, Eric Garner was recorded being choked to death by police, all while
screaming out that he could not breath. In another instance, Walter Scott, an unarmed Black man,
was shot in the back by a White police officer as he tried to run away. While the officer tried to
claim self-defense in this case, a video recording of the incident shows that Scott posed no
imminent threat to the safety of the officer. Moreover, in one of the most disturbing and widely
followed hate crime cases of the 21st century, neo-Nazi terrorist Dylann Roof was convicted of
killing nine people at a historic African American church in South Carolina. More recently, the
murders of unarmed Black men Ahmaud Arbery and George Floyd have been caught on camera.
Instances of violence against African Americans such as these have sparked widespread protests
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and calls for more police accountability.181 These calls for change have forced American
politicians to directly confront issues of racial violence and injustice. In fact, in President Joe
Biden’s inauguration speech, he made promises to deliver racial justice—a sign that positive
change for racial equality could be on the horizon. Unfortunately, however, the historic pattern of
racial progress being followed by racial restriction in the United States shows that meaningful
progress for African Americans will always be met with some sort of resistance, and the 21st
century is no exception.
Just as African American progress during Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement
posed a threat to the political and economic standing of Whites, today, efforts to reduce the mass
incarceration of African Americans poses a similar, albeit different, threat. Hundreds of
corporations and millions of people have a vested interest in the system of mass incarceration that
disproportionately effects minorities—African Americans in particular. Any efforts to change this
system, then, poses a threat to these people and these businesses. As CoreCivic so bluntly puts it
in their risk statement:
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of
enforcement efforts, the expansion of alternatives to incarceration and detention, leniency in
conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices through the decriminalization of certain
activities that are currently proscribed by criminal laws, disruptions to the criminal justice system…
For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration
could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing
demand for correctional or detention facilities to house them.182

At the bottom line, vested economic interests in mass incarceration lean on government
bureaucracy to maintain the status quo—that being extreme levels of incarceration in the United
States, particularly among minority populations. This happens despite all the evidence that the
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system of mass incarceration runs contrary to the public good. Most importantly to the
maintenance of the status quo and the expansion of the prison-industrial complex is policing
efforts—a fact that has held true for decades. These efforts have, however, evolved with the times.
Instead of targeting African American through overtly racist laws and tactics, today, police hide
behind a wall of data and analytics. We are now in the age of predictive policing—a relatively new
development in police tactics that poses yet another serious risk to Black communities across the
country.

Part I: Predictive Policing
Predictive policing is the use of data and analytics to make predictions about future crime for
proactive police intervention. While various forms of predictive policing have been around for
decades, today, the methods for analyzing the geospatial dispersal of crime and identifying
perpetrators now look much different in the United States. Police now have access to analytical
tools and programs that use sophisticated mathematical algorithms to draw on massive data sets to
make predictions about criminal activity. Importantly, the increased use and reliance on predictive
technology in policing follows the global trend of increased reliance on data and prediction for
decision making. In fact, models for evaluation and prediction now pervade nearly every corner of
our society—sports teams use data to better prepare for their opponents; school systems create
models to evaluate the effectiveness of teachers; multibillion dollar corporations use algorithms to
determine patterns in consumer behavior, to make risk assessments, and assist in operations
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management.183 Now, police departments use similar programs to predict crime and evaluate
risks.184
Two methods of predictive policing have risen to the fore—namely, hot-spot policing and
person-based predictive policing. First, hot-spot policing is a place-based approach to policing that
falls under the taxonomy of “methods for predicting crimes.”185 Hot-spot policing methods use
historical crime data to identify specific geographic locations where crime has frequently occurred
in the past. In fact, hot-spot models can use years’ worth of crime data to generate hot-spots.186
Under the assumption that crime is likely to occur again in areas that it has been highly
concentrated in the past, police allocate more resources to these areas. The primary stated goal of
this effort is the deterrence of crime, as increasing the number of officers in a particular area should
hypothetically dissuade people from offending.187 This is predicated on rational choice theory—
an economic theory that reasons people rationally weigh the benefits of their actions against the
costs when making a decision.
There are several different ways in which predictive algorithms generate and report crime
hot-spots. In general, police rely on geographic information software (GIS) that use geospatial
analysis to generate maps with the visual location of crime hot-spots. Importantly, hot-spots can
vary greatly in size and scope; some hot-spots are identified as individual buildings, while others
may include entire neighborhoods. Depending on the type of hot-spot police hope to identify,
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different approaches to mapping are required to assist in police intervention.188 One of the first
modern programs (and one of the most popular), PredPol, collects police data related to crime type,
crime location and crime date and time to generate 500 by 500-foot squares on a map relating to
the areas deemed high-risk.189 Hot-spot policing has increased in scale and importance for law
enforcement in the United States.
While hot-spot policing focuses on geospatial indicators for crime intervention, personbased prediction methods focus on individual indicators of crime to assist in allocating police
resources. Falling into the category of “methods for predicting offenders”, experts designed
person-based predictive algorithms to assess the risk an of individual or organization with regard
to the likelihood they will commit a crime or be a victim of a crime.190 In order to identify the risk
level of individuals, these algorithms are designed to take into account several factors, including,
among other things—education and employment, family history, history of drug and alcohol
abuse, friends, recreational activities and most importantly, prior criminal history. The use of this
data to generate risk assessments is based on the notion that (1) identifiable groups with these
indicators pose a risk for crime and violence, and (2) certain people within these social networks
pose an even greater risk depending on their relationship to the aforementioned factors.191 With
these insight related to criminal activity serving as the basis for the use of personalized data,
person-based predictive algorithms synthesize massive amounts of data to predict offenders and
prioritize who is targeted for police intervention. The use of these systems is meant to allow police
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to develop targeted strategies for crime intervention in a more efficient and cost-effective
manner.192
The introduction of predictive policing methods such as hot-spot policing and person-based
predictive policing has massively altered law-enforcement operations. With increased attention
being drawn to the long history of racism in policing and the broader criminal justice system,
predictive policing offers, at first glance, a bold step towards reform. Unlike people, data itself
cannot have subjective or racist views. Advocates of predictive policing commonly argue that
these programs have the ability to effectively end racism in police tactics—using technology to
interpret “objective” crime data rather than relying on potentially biased police discretion in
decision making.193 Because the shift towards data analysis in policing fits within the broader trend
of increased reliance on analytics in nearly every facet of human decision-making, its procedures
and outcomes go unquestioned. What if, however, the data and models used in predictive policing
are not as objective as they may seem?
Despite the widely-held belief that predictive policing is objective, in reality, it most often
reinforces already-prevalent and deeply rooted perceptions of Black criminality. Indeed, as Cathy
O’Neil notes in her book Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
Threatens Democracy— “…models, despite their reputation for impartiality, reflect goals and
ideology.”194 Both hot-spot models and person-based prediction models reflect longstanding racial
ideologies that have permeated law enforcement agencies over the course of United States history.
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In fact, contemporary racial inequality is a reflection of historical attitudes and behaviors that feed
into self-confirming stereotypes.

Part II: Racial Inequality in Relation to Self-Confirming Stereotypes
Longstanding racial biases and inequality in the United States are deeply rooted issues that feed
on themselves, making the problem worse and worse over time. In fact, in The Anatomy of Racial
Inequality, author, and economist Glenn C. Loury proposes that racial inequality itself should be
understood as “a series of ‘vicious circles of cumulative causation.’”195 Despite the scientific
evidence that race itself is a physically arbitrary trait, we, as human beings, are conditioned to
group people based on observable traits, and to make inferences about individuals and groups
based on these traits.196 As part of this classification process, human beings filter social
experiences through racial classifications—endowing social significance to otherwise arbitrary
physical traits.197 Of course, one’s race in and of itself gives no indication of their unobservable
traits or qualities—however, the human propensity to make inferences when presented with limited
information gives social significance to the idea of race.198 Importantly, as rational beings, humans
create generalizations through reasonable cognitive processes. As Loury notes, however— “…
this generalization is ‘reasonable’ in the specific sense that it is self-confirming: Observers, by
acting on the generalization, set in motion a sequence of events that has the effect of reinforcing
their initial judgement.”199 Observing agents create the very facts upon which their generalizations
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rely—a difficult to break cognitive cycle that gives unwarranted social value to the arbitrariness
of race.
Not only do humans create generalizations as a product of self-confirming stereotypes, but
we also use race to derive conclusions regarding people’s inner qualities—often with disastrous
consequences for Black individuals.200 This process of giving social meaning to race—particularly
the Black race—has been well established throughout United States history. For example,
Blackness has been historically associated with things such as crime and defeatism—especially
after the demise of the American slave system.201 These racial stigmatizations—while often
considered to be a part of ‘Black pathology’—are, in fact, rooted instead in historical processes.202
Programs such as convict leasing and, nearly a century later, the War on Drugs have fostered
negative connotations regarding the Black race. In the United States, the inferior status endowed
upon slaves created an enduring perception of Blacks as social-others.203 Since the establishment
of this perception in American collective conscience, Black Americans have continued to feel the
effects—views of Black criminality and defeatism are a mere extension of this perception of Black
pathological inferiority.204
Despite these destructive views that have accrued over time, Black Americans have done
their best to push back against these narratives and perceptions. They not only fought long and
hard to for citizenship during Civil Rights Movement, but they also spent the better portion of the
twentieth century reclaiming their humanity from the clutches of ideological White supremacy. As
White powerbrokers used urban policies to systematically deprive Black communities of the tools
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necessary to be upwardly mobile, Black Americans also fought long and hard for community
control over neighborhoods and spaces that had been torn asunder by systematically racist policies
such as redlining, slum clearance, public housing, and freeway construction. By the late twentieth
century, however, these efforts often failed to meet the mounting challenge of urban decay and
decline. In fact, during the War on Drugs of the 1980s, many African Americans supported toughon-crime policies—the same policies that led to the mass incarceration of millions in the 20th
century. For example, many Black leaders and citizens supported President Clinton’s Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, an act that included the death penalty for some
drug offenses, billions of funding for police and prisons, and the infamous ‘Three-Strikes, You’re
Out’ rule.205 The support for this legislation showed the desire among the African American
community to fight back against crime in their communities and reduce the perception that they
were innately criminal. Calls for more punitive policies, however, were accompanied by calls for
improvement in education, employment, housing and other areas that disproportionately affected
African American communities.206 Unfortunately, American ignored these calls for structural
reform—reform necessary to fix the underlying solutions of crime. Blacks, then, were left to face
the consequences of their support for punitive policies with little acknowledgement for their desire
to reduce crime in the United States. More simply, African Americans were often blamed for
problems not of their making.
Negative connotations associated with Black pathology have dire contemporary
implications. Because people mistakenly associate Blackness itself with things such as crime, they
are likely to feel as though Black individuals are merely facing the consequences of their actions—
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with utter disregard for the social institutions that may truly be causing the issues. In turn, observers
are less likely to support any sort of structural change to support Black individuals and
communities. Without reform, however, social conditions that give rise to racial stigma persist,
and these stigmas are thus reinforced.207 Indeed, a study conducted by scholars’ Rebecca C. Hetey
and Jennifer L. Eberhardt found that exposure to racial disparities in policing and incarceration
actually increases public support for punitive policies that create the disparities in the first place.208
Importantly, high rates of incarceration among the Black population in particular have material, as
well as cognitive consequences for Black communities. For example, one study found that having
an incarcerated parent makes it far more likely that a child will drop out or be expelled from school,
experience learning and behavioral disabilities, and suffer from things such as increased stress and
anxiety—issues that can be a sign of future incarceration themselves. Unsurprisingly, an African
American child is six times as likely as a White child to have a parent who is or has been
incarcerated.209
In the end, racial inequality is an enduring feature of contemporary American society—
reinforced through historically rooted perceptions related to Blackness. Building on this analysis,
In the next section, I argue that perceptions of Blacks as criminal and disparities in criminal justice
outcomes—in the era of big data and mass incarceration—now rely on self-confirming cycles of
causation produced by predictive policing algorithms.
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Part III: The Data Problem
Despite the notion that predictive policing methods—including hot-spot and person-based
methods—are part of a progressive movement in the crime fighting arena based on objective data,
in reality, these methods merely reinforce Black criminality and public perceptions of it.
Predictive policing—as well as any actuarial technology—only functions as well as the input data
allows. In other words, bad data leads to bad predictions, and these predictions can lead police
forces to disproportionately target specific individuals and communities. As methods used by
police to predict crime, predictive policing is rooted in historic crime data collected by the police
themselves.210 Experts contend, however, that this data is less a representation of crime than it is a
representation of police activity. Crime statistics, in fact, have been noted to be a misleading—if
not entirely inaccurate—representation of actual crime.211 For one thing, crime itself is a relatively
infrequent event that often goes entirely undiscovered—in a sense, searching for crime is like
searching for a proverbial needle in a haystack. Moreover, a great deal of crime goes unreported
by citizens. Indeed, the 2020 National Crime Victimization Survey found that only 40 percent of
violent victimizations and 33 percent of property victimizations were reported to police in 2020.212
Finally and most importantly to this report, is the role that police discretion plays in the formulation
of crime statistics. Police have both the discretion to choose where to search for crime as well as
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what to report as a crime. With this fact in consideration, it is entirely true that police activity can
drastically effect and manipulate crime data. As scholar Carl B. Klockars masterfully conveys:
…both crime and crime clearance rates can be manipulated dramatically by any police agency with
a will to do so. It is also absolutely axiomatic that for certain types of crime (drug offenses,
prostitution, corruption, illegal gambling, receiving stolen property, driving under the influence,
etc.), police statistics are in no way reflective of the level of that type of crime or of the rise and fall
of it, but they are reflective of the level of police agency resources dedicated to its detection. Is there
a police chief anywhere in this country who does not believe that he or she could double or half the
drug crimes his or her agency reports by doubling or halving the number of officers assigned to drug
enforcement?213

The fact that African Americans are vastly overrepresented in the criminal justice system stems
from historically racist criminal laws and police procedures. Because African Americans are
overrepresented in the system, however, this also means that they are overrepresented in reported
crime data—the same crime data used to inform predictive models. Once this data is entered into
a predictive model, that model is unable to account for biases or inaccuracies.214 As a result, Black
Americans and Black communities have continued to be disproportionately targeted by the police.
Evidently, policing tactics have not changed with the introduction of sophisticated methods such
as hot-spot and person-based policing—all that has changed are the tools being used.
Importantly, as bad data is fed into predictive models, and a particular group or area is
targeted for police intervention at a disproportionate rate, there begins to arise a growing imbalance
between the [actual] offending population and the carceral population—a social process scholar
Bernard E. Harcourt calls the “ratchet effect.”215 To illustrate this idea, consider that between 1991
and 1993, African Americans made up 16 percent of reported drug dealers, yet made up 49 percent
of arrests for the sale of drugs.216 In this scenario, the 16 percent represents the actual offending
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population, while the 49 percent represents the actual carceral population. This had national
implications for many of America’s urban African Americans. For instance, according to the Los
Angeles Times, “In Los Angeles County, hundreds of white crack traffickers were convicted in
state court between 1988 and 1994, according to data obtained by The Times. No whites were
prosecuted federally during this period….” The same article later demonstrated that 96 percent of
federal crack defendants were not white during the same period.217 Clearly, this variation is
evidence of an imbalance between the actual offending population and the actual carceral
population—if distribution were balanced, we would expect to see African Americans
representing 16 percent of the carceral population. This disparity—which exists as a result of
longstanding biases and discriminatory practices—necessarily has a distortive effect on law
enforcement operations.
If police use crime data and the carceral population to allocate resources, they will, by
design, allocate more resources towards Black individuals and communities—a process that can
be described as criminal profiling. Over time, then, the disparity between the offending population
and the carceral population will continue to grow as more resources are allocated based on arrest
data and the carceral population—the more time and resources spent policing a particular subgroup
(or region), the more crime will be found in that subgroup (or region).218 As Harcourt notes,
“criminal profiling accentuates the apparent correlation between the group trait and criminality by
skewing the carceral population, which is what we all use to proxy criminality.”219 In other words,
as more Black Americans become part of the carceral population, criminality becomes more
intertwined with Blackness itself, and police feel justified in their efforts to over police Black
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individuals and communities. Moreover, increased criminal supervision and incarceration has the
ability to actually create crime by reducing work opportunities, disrupting education, and breaking
down families and communities.220 In fact, in a recently released report by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, approximately 33 percent of people released from federal prison in 2010 were unable to
secure employment at any point over the next four years.221 Additionally, the “Prison Policy
Initiative” found that a formerly incarcerated person only has a one-in-twenty chance of attaining
a college degree, compared to one-in-three for the general public.222 Finally, the most recent
available data shows that more than half of the U.S. prison population have minor children, and
parental incarceration has been found to contribute to learning disabilities, antisocial behavior, and
delinquent activity that can lead to further crime.223

Part IV: Enduring Inequality Through Hot-Spot Policing
The implications of this intensifying ratcheting effect are evident with predictive policing models.
With specific regard to hot-spot policing, the data used to determine crime hot-spots reflects the
historic over policing of Black communities. In particular, civil unrest that characterized the Civil
Rights movement and the hyperbolized War on Drugs generated extensive police attention in
predominantly Black, urban centers.224 In turn, this led to more arrests among the Black population
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and in Black communities—by spending more time looking for crime in a particular area, it
becomes more likely that crime will be found in that area.225 When this crime data is entered into
hot-spot models—however skewed it may be—the model generates hot-spots in the same
communities where the law enforcement collected crime data. Police, using these models, are then
justified in focusing their resources on those crime hot-spots. In fact, information about crime hotspots has been shown to cause over policing of designated areas and increasingly aggressive
intervention tactics. As Andrew Guthrie Ferguson notes, “Individuals in the predicted areas—
innocent or guilty—will be seen with the same suspicious eyes.”226 Of course, as police spend
more time in the same communities where the data was first collected, they will both expect to
find more crime in those areas and are likely to find more crime due to increased monitorization.227
This then leads to more skewed crime data being fed into the hot-spot models, and police are once
again justified in heading back to those areas—a vicious, self-confirming cycle.
The discriminatory nature of self-confirming feedback loops innate to hot-spot policing is
confirmed by a 2016 study in which researchers Kristian Lum and William Isaac apply the PredPol
algorithm to drug crime in Oakland, California. In this study, Kristian Lum and William Isaac
provide compelling evidence that demonstrates how predictive policing of drug crimes results in
increasingly disproportionate levels of policing in already over-policed communities in Oakland,
California.228 In this study, Lum and Isaac first compare survey data from the 2011 National
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Survey on Drug Use and Health with drug arrest data collected by the Oakland Police Department.
Through this comparison, the researchers found that drug arrests in neighborhoods around West
Oakland and International Boulevard—two regions with predominantly non-White, low-income
populations—were approximately 200 times greater than areas outside these regions, despite the
fact that survey data shows drug usage to be more uniformly distributed throughout Oakland. To
gauge how this clearly biased police data affects predictive models, Lum and Isaac applied the
PredPol algorithm to the Oakland police database to see how the algorithm would flag hot-spots
in the city for every day in 2011.229 Unsurprisingly, they found that the locations targeted as hotspots were the same areas that had been over-represented in the historical police data—in other
words, the PredPol algorithm reproduced police biases in its model.
With this information in hand, the researchers ran an experiment to observe the
consequences of the ratchet effect. With the assumption that the more time police spend in a
location, they more crime they will find there, the researchers increased the variable number of
observed crimes in hot-spot areas targeted by police on a daily basis by 20 percent. This process,
as expected, created a feedback loop where the algorithm increasingly predicted that crime would
occur in those specific locations—a process that, in reality, would continually send police back to
the same locations.230
The self-confirming nature of hot-spot policing is not only relevant in an experimental
setting—hot-spot models are leading law-enforcement to over police African American
communities in real time. In New York City, for example, one study found that there were 5.8
times as many enforcement actions against Black people compared to White people between 2003
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and 2018.231 During this period, the New York Police Department experimented with hot-spot
models (i.e., PredPol and Palantir) and eventually developed their own algorithm. In Tulsa,
Oklahoma, Black people are 2.3 times as likely to be arrested compared to Whites, and arrest rates
are positively correlated with the percentage of the population that is Black in particular region.
Moreover, a large percentage of arrests in Tulsa (40 percent) are based on outstanding county and
municipal warrants, indicating that a huge number of arrests are for minor infractions (i.e., failure
to pay court fees) that disproportionately effect those with limited economic resources.232
Unsurprisingly, Tulsa’s policing efforts have been supported by crime mapping software provided
by the corporation Crime Tech Solutions since 2016.233

Part V: Enduring Inequality Through Person-Based Predictive Policing
Hot-spot policing is not the only mechanism used by law enforcement that reinforces
inequalities—person-based predictive algorithms operate in largely the same capacity. Just as
historic over policing in Black communities has led to those areas being labeled as crime hot-spots,
external factors influence the disproportionate rate at which African Americans are targeted by
person-based systems.234 Historical discriminatory practices in the United States in just about
every walk of life (i.e., education, housing, criminal justice) have put African Americans at a major
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social disadvantage. In the United States, Black Americans aged 16 and above are 5 percent more
likely to unemployed compared to Whites, Black Americans are 64.1 percent less likely to own a
house compared to Whites, and Black homeowners have an average income that is more than $33
thousand less than White homeowners.235 Factors such as these weigh heavily in the algorithmic
risk assessment process, so it is no surprise that African Americans are more likely to be labeled
high risk compared to their White counterparts.
Despite the fact that disparities such as these are becoming more recognized as the result
of systematic racism rather than Black pathology, person-based predictive programs continue to
rely heavily on these factors as risk indicators.236 Naturally, because Blacks are disproportionately
affected by these “risk factors,” the person-based models that implement the data
disproportionately identify Blacks as posing an increased risk for crime or victimization—thus
prompting police to pay more attention to these individuals.237 Of course, by paying increased
attention to individuals labeled as high risk for crime, police departments will not only expect to
find these individuals involved in crime due to the designation, but will be increasingly likely to
find them committing a crime simply through increased monitoring.238 For those with prior
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criminal history in particular, it can be incredibly difficult to avoid recommitting crime to some
extent—the stigma associated with a criminal conviction often leaves very few economic options
available upon release, forcing these individuals to turn back to illicit activity to support
themselves.239
One prime example regarding the discriminatory nature of person-based predictive
policing comes from the city of Chicago. In 2013, the Illinois Institute of Technology partnered
with the Chicago Police Department to create an algorithm that would create a “strategic subject
list”—also known as Chicago’s “heat list.”240 This algorithm set out to predict gun violence in the
city—using several variables to create a risk score between 1 and 500 for individuals. Although
the algorithm used to determine risk scores has not been released—nor has the weight given to
each variable in creating scores— the CPD eventually released the eight factors they claimed were
involved in creating risk scores after a legal battle with the Chicago Sun-Times. Those factors
include arrest for gun crimes, violent/drug crimes, the number of times a person has been shot or
assaulted, age at the time of the last arrest, gang membership, and a formula that could tell whether
someone’s criminal activity was increasing.241
In all, the Strategic Subject List included 398,684 individuals—52 percent of whom were
African American.242 Importantly, the CPD has claimed that individuals are only really monitored
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once their risk scores reaches the threshold of a score of 250 or above.243 Although it is not exactly
clear why 250 is used as a threshold—nor is it clear what exactly scoring above this threshold
means for individuals—we do know that more than 287,000 people (approximately 72 percent of
the list) met this threshold.244 Moreover, inclusion on the so called ‘heat list’—particularly for
those with higher scores—qualified someone for “custom notification.” Custom notification,
according to the Chicago Police Department, is a process by which selected individuals are paid a
home visit—typically by an officer, social worker, and member of the community—a visit in
which they are delivered a “custom notification letter” meant to inform them of both what the
police already know about them [criminally], as well as the consequences for future public
violence.245
The strategic subject list proved to be far from an objective or equitable risk model. For
one thing, research by the organization Upturn found that as of 2017, over 126,000 people on the
heat list had never once been arrested or fell victim to a crime—and over 88,000 of these
individuals had a risk score above 250.246 In other words, the strategic subject list encouraged
police to monitor individuals even if they had not ever been involved in a crime. Making matters
worse, a 2016 study conducted by the RAND Association found that inclusion on the heat list did
not correspond with increased victimization of a shooting or homicide. Inclusion on the list did,
however, correspond with an increased likelihood of being arrested for a shooting.247 Instead of
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being an effective tool for social intervention and crime deterrence, the heat list proved to function
as little more than a most wanted list. The program was officially put to rest in the Fall of 2019.
Predictive policing legitimizes widely held views of African American criminal pathology
and shapes our perceptions of justice in much the same way that Jim Crow and ‘tough on crime’
era policies did—an effect that is by design. In fact, by over policing Black individuals and
communities with the help of “objective” models, the correlation between [Black] group traits and
criminal behavior is strengthened while casting aside social structures and historic discrimination
that feed into bad data.248 With both hot-spot and person-based policing, the vicious, reaffirming
cycle of Black criminality is evident. First, racial prejudice and historically discriminatory police
practices led to the over policing of Black communities and individuals—fostering perceptions of
Black criminality and creating a reality that reinforces these perceptions. Data collected from this
racially tortured history is then fed into predictive models where Black individuals and
communities are reinforced as criminal—leading to increased supervision. As a result, Black
individuals are more likely to be punished (in this case incarcerated)—ripping communities apart
and strengthening perceptions of Black criminality and legitimizing further discrimination that
caused the problems in the first place. In the end—as Dorothy Roberts nicely sums it up—"Today’s
computerized predictive policing reincarnates in high-tech garb ‘vague loitering and vagrancy laws
[that historically gave] license to police officers to arrest people purely on the basis of race-based
suspicion,’ categorically identifying Black people as lawless apart from their criminal conduct.”249
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Chapter Four:
Predictive Policing and the Prison-Industrial Complex
The conventional wisdom is that there is an emerging consensus that the criminal
legal system is “broken.” But the system is “broken” only to the extent that one
believes its purpose is to promote the well-being of all members of our society. If
the function of the modern punishment system is to preserve racial and economic
hierarchy through brutality and control, then its bureaucracy is performing well.250

-

Alec Karakatsanis

Despite arguments that predictive policing is a progressive trend in law enforcement, these
methods continue to harm the same communities that have felt the historical effects of racism and
discrimination throughout United States history. On the one hand, predictive policing has potential
to improve law enforcement and how we deal with crime. If used correctly, predictive policing
could allow law enforcement to take advantage of limited resources and efficiently recognize at
risk individuals and communities—communities that could benefit from positive social
interventions.251 On the other hand, however, predictive policing’s primary role in law
enforcement has been to reinforce perceptions of Black criminality and to target at risk
communities for punishment. With that said, a casual observer might conclude that—like the larger
criminal justice system—predictive policing is merely flawed in its [relatively] early stages and in
need of reform. This idea, however, is only true to the extent that we believe the function of
predictive models is to promote a more objective/egalitarian form of law enforcement. Ultimately,
predictive policing is already effectively serving its designed purpose—that purpose being the
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reinforcement of the prison-industrial complex through effective and efficient minority
criminalization.
The United States has developed a carceral approach to justice—an argument that is
supported by the incredibly large number of individuals currently incarcerated or under some form
of government control. According to scholar Dorothy Roberts “Under a carceral approach, the
state’s aim is to control populations rather than to adjudicate individual guilt or innocence, to
manage social inequalities rather than to aid those who are suffering from them.”252 Moreover, as
the carceral state has expanded, hundreds of corporations and millions of people now profit from
mass incarceration as part of the prison-industrial complex. This intertwined relationship between
profit and incarceration has strengthened the punitive nature of the criminal justice system—any
changes to the system pose a massive financial threat to those with a vested economic interest in
the prison-industrial complex. Ultimately, because the system is designed to punish rather than
support—to incarcerate rather than improve social inequality—it must be expected that, by nature,
predictive policing will reinforce the punitive, profit driven goals of the prison-industrial complex.

Part I: Institutionalization of Predictive Policing
By 2008, interest in the use and development of predictive algorithms began to grow substantially
in several major cities across the United States. In fact, the National Institute of Justice began
offering millions of dollars in grant funding to police departments to develop these programs.253
For example, the Office of Inspector General for the City of Chicago reported that the Chicago
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Police Department received $3.8 million over ten years through federal grants—money used to
develop the Strategic Subject List and Crime and Victimization Risk Model.254 Other cities
including Memphis, Miami, San Diego, and Washington D.C. have received grant funding from
the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA).255 Moreover, as predictive policing grew in popularity
among law enforcement, several private, for-profit institutions jumped at the chance to develop
predictive policing technology. In fact, several notable cities have paid large sums of money to
for-profit institutions for the use of their technology. In Fresno, California, the Fresno Police
Department signed a one-year, $80,000 contract with PredPol in March 2016.256 In May 2013, the
City of Richmond, Virginia signed a three-year $150,000 dollar contract with PredPol that expired
in 2016. The San Jose Police Department in California began using predictive analytics from The
Omega Group in 2015 when they signed a five-year, $443,554 contract with the organization. In
St. Louis County, Missouri—containing Ferguson, Missouri—the police department began using
the predictive technology Hunchlab in 2015 for the price of $45,000 dollars the first year, and
$35,000 dollars for each subsequent year.257 Public purchase orders obtained by the Brennan
Center for Justice show that New York City—one of the largest cities in the nation—paid $2.5
million to the company Palantir for the use of their technology.258
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Ultimately, these contracts mean that organizations such as PredPol are profit-driven,
privately owned corporations and their predictive technologies have financial incentives in making
law enforcement agencies dependent on their products—i.e., they are driven by a quest for profit
rather than the achievement of creating safer communities or more equitable police practices. In
order to build this dependence, however, predictive models must provide unquestionable value to
law enforcement—the results must justify the cost of the models. This value is created not through
the promotion of more equitable outcomes or even the reduction of crime—instead, predictive
policing algorithms provide value to law enforcement by increasing the efficiency at which they
can round up and arrest large numbers of people.259 In fact, one primary measure of police success
is enforcement productivity—including arrests, citations, and searches.260 This ultimately means
that as police search and arrest more and more individuals with the help of predictive algorithms,
their operations are deemed successful regardless of discriminatory impact or actual crime
reduction.
Importantly, predictive policing models such as PredPol are designed to predict low-level
street crime—the type of crime typically committed by individuals with limited social and
economic capital.261 In other words, predictive algorithms intentionally focus police resources on
taking down criminals with little ability to fight back, despite the fact that other crime, such as
white-collar crime, tends to have a more far-reaching negative impact. As author Jennifer Taub
notes, “White collar crime in America, such as fraud and embezzlement, costs victims an estimated
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$300 billion to $800 billion per year. Yet street level “property” crimes, including burglary,
larceny, and theft, cost us far less— around $16 billion annually, according to the FBI.”262 That
the vast majority of people in prison are poor and Black indicates that police actively choose to
focus their resources on that particular subset of the population, as targeting this group is the most
efficient way to find crime and make arrests—arrests that fill the pockets of the police and others
with a stake in the prison-industrial complex. This also indicates that criminal law and procedure
are designed to uphold the interests of those with social and economic capital—the force of the
law falls on those who cannot challenge it. By using historical crime data—data derived from
historically racist police tactics—police are drawn back into these communities, where they can
efficiently arrest more African Americans for low-level crimes—crimes that would likely go
unnoticed but for the increased police presence.263
While the use of predictive models may improve the efficiency by which police are able to
detect crime and make arrests, this efficiency comes at the expense of actual crime reduction. For
one thing, recidivism rates are remarkably high in the United States. In one study by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, researchers found that 83 percent of prisoners released across 30 states in 2005
were rearrested within nine years, and at least 44 percent of these prisoners were rearrested at least
once within the first year of release.264 Moreover, several programs have been independently
evaluated by their ability to reduce crime—with telling results. For example, a study by the RAND
corporation found that individuals on Chicago’s Strategic Subject List were just as likely to
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become a victim of a homicide or shooting compared to individuals excluded from the list—
demonstrating clear failure by the SSL to reduce gun violence.265 Other programs, too, have found
that their models were woefully ineffective. In 2019, the Los Angeles Police Department—one of
the pioneers in the use of predictive algorithms—concluded through an internal audit that there
was insufficient data to determine whether or not PredPol’s software helped to reduce crime.266
Ultimately, predictive policing models have become a tool to uphold the structure of the
prison-industrial complex rather than one used to fight crime with objectivity. By sending law
enforcement to monitor areas or people deemed high risk, the police are naturally more successful
in finding crimes in these areas—providing validation that the predictive models work well,
despite the discriminatory impact.267 With the notion that the models are working well, police
departments are willing to pay large sums of money for the use of the technology. For example,
from November 2012 through March 2014 in New Orleans, law enforcement successfully indicted
83 alleged gang members with the help of Palantir’s software—software that helped to create “The
NOLA Model.”268 During this time, there was, in fact, a temporary decline in violent crime—
however, an independent study found that this drop off was not the result of the use of Palantir’s
model. Nonetheless, Palantir leveraged the “success” of their work in New Orleans to extend their
contract in the city three times, as well as to win large contracts with cities in the United States
and around the world.269 In the end, this shows that companies that produce predictive models
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profit from enabling law enforcement to over monitor historically at-risk communities and
individuals—a process that leads to more efficient arrests and once again reinforces the
effectiveness of these tools. As predictive models have become institutionalized as part of the
wider prison-industrial complex, the sad reality is that these programs to rely upon the Black
criminality and perceptions of it that they innately create.

Part II: An Intentional Lack of Transparency
With all the issues surrounding the discriminatory nature of predictive policing algorithms, these
models are able to avoid public scrutiny due to an intentional lack of transparency. In recent years,
several scholars have started to identify predictive policing algorithms as “black boxes.”270 In one
sense, machine learning algorithms are designed to produce outcomes directly from static datasets
without human oversite or interference. This machine learning process, however, means that
humans—including the experts who design the algorithms—are unable to fully grasp how the data
is being interpreted.271 As one scholar puts it— “machine-learning algorithms can constantly
evolve, meaning that outputs can change from one moment to the next without any explanation or
ability to reverse engineer the decision process.”272
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Predictive algorithms acts as “black boxes” in another way—namely, companies that
produce these technologies often claim proprietary rights over their codes. As private enterprises,
the companies that produce predictive models are in the business of selling their technology. By
releasing information related to their algorithms, companies risk revealing trade secret
information. As a result, companies make “trade secret” claims to protect themselves from
disclosing this information.273 What if, however, the lack of transparency with regard to predictive
algorithms has less to do with protecting trade secrets, and more to do with supporting and
expanding the reach of the prison-industrial complex?
The prison-industrial complex relies on human bodies for its survival. Predictive
algorithms, by design, allow police to supply these bodies more efficiently—due in large part to
the lack of transparency. In fact, communities impacted by predictive policing tactics have
essentially no ability to truly understand how the technology is affecting their lives. The report
titled “Garbage in Gospel Out” summarizes this issue:

The relationship between the private companies that build these tools and police departments is
insular and exclusive. With exceptions in a very small number of jurisdictions, police departments
do not inform impacted communities of their desire to deploy these tools, do not provide a
justification to the impacted communities for the tools, and do not disclose the actual use of these
tools or the policies that govern their use (to the extent that there are any).274

In New Orleans, for example, an investigation by The Verge reported that several key city council
members and attorneys had no knowledge that the city had adopted Palantir’s predictive policing
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model.275 Still, even if law enforcement were to inform communities of their use of predictive
algorithms, that would only go so far—the complexities and inconsistencies associated with both
the algorithms and data they rely upon prevent impacted individuals and communities from fully
understanding how the technology is being deployed.
The lack of transparency with regard to predictive algorithms also serves to protect police
from violations of the Fourth Amendment. Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must
have either reasonable suspicion [that an individual is involved with criminal activity] or probable
cause in order to conduct a stop and search. With regard to what can be considered reasonable
suspicion, the use of predictive algorithms is uncharted territory. In fact, scholars believe it likely
that these algorithms—like criminal tips and profiles—will be accepted as reasonable suspicion to
at least some extent.276 If accepted, the lack of transparency with predictive algorithms will make
them almost impossible challenge, and will therefor improve the efficiency at which individuals
are cycled through the profitable carceral system.
With the understanding that predictive methods allow police to efficiently sweep up and
incarcerate large numbers of African Americans with little scrutiny or accountability, many of
those with a stake in the prison-industrial complex now do what they can to support the use of the
technology. One way that this is done is through police foundations. While the National Police
Foundations website claims that “The National Police Foundation’s mission is to advance policing
through innovation and science,” In reality, police foundations are a medium through which
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corporations can privately fund police forces.277 Importantly, police foundations are private
charities, meaning that they are not subject to the same public information laws that apply to law
enforcement agencies.278 This means that there is little to no public oversite or input with regard
to how police foundation funds are spent—despite having a direct impact on how the public is
policed. While there is very little transparency regarding how police use funds provided by police
foundations, available evidence shows that a good portion of funding from police foundations is
used to increasingly militarize police forces and arm them with surveillance technology that puts
minority communities at increased risk.279 For example, nearly half of the $6.5 million distributed
by the New York Police Foundation in 2013 went towards to NYPD’s “technology campaign.”280
Although police foundations are protected from disclosing their donors, existing
information reveals that companies with a direct stake in the prison-industrial complex have
contributed to police foundations. For example, the publicly traded company Palantir—a large
producer of predictive policing technology—has donated to both Los Angeles and New York City
police foundations, areas that unsurprisingly have used and signed contracts with Palantir in the
past.281 Moreover, other corporations who benefit from incarceration—and thus the use of
predictive policing models—contribute to police foundations. Indeed, BlackRock, one of the
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largest investors in private prison companies CoreCivic and The GEO Group—is deeply involved
with the New York City Police Foundation.282 By supporting police foundations and the
introduction of predictive models, companies like BlackRock indirectly support their investments
in the private-prison industry.

Part III: Law Enforcement Financial Incentives
Law enforcement themselves have selfish—if not entirely twisted—financial incentives to
implement predictive algorithms into their methods for finding crime. Perhaps the most prominent
and contested incentive dates back to the War on Drugs with the introduction of civil forfeiture.283
For police, the incentive to forfeit property is straightforward: a vast majority of revenues from
forfeited property go to law enforcement budgets. In fact, the 3rd edition of the report “Policing for
Profit” finds— “In 32 states and at the federal level, between 80 and 100% of forfeiture proceeds
go to funds controlled by law enforcement.”284 This incentive has proved fruitful for law
enforcement across the country—In 2018, reported data for the federal government, Washington
D.C., and forty-two states shows assets forfeited in the amount of more than $3 billion; Since 2000,
available data shows that, for all states and the federal government, forfeitures exceed $68
billion.285
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Profiting from forfeited property—without even needing to prove said property is related
to criminal activity—is, of course, motivation to seize property. Again, however, police do not
focus their resources on seizing large assets from those with social capital or political influence.
Instead, a vast majority of forfeited property come from small seizures suspected of being related
to small crimes. Across 21 states with available data, average cash forfeitures—by far the most
frequent type of civil forfeiture—equal just under $1.3 thousand.286 In Pennsylvania, half of their
currency forfeitures were below $369. Moreover, one study found that from 2012 – 2017 in Cook
County, Illinois, law enforcement seized $150 million in assets, yet many of the seizures were
concentrated in the poorest areas of the county and valued under $100. The process of seizing
predominantly small amounts of cash makes a great deal of sense when thinking in terms of
efficiency. First, those who have their property seized are far less likely to fight back—they cost
of attorney would more than likely exceed the cost of the forfeiture itself (considering the average
cost of forfeiture mentioned above).287 This is compounded by the fact that people at greatest risk
of having their cash seized are low-income, uneducated minorities. Not only do these people have
less resources available to contest the forfeiture to begin, but they are left with even less once their
assets are taken under mere suspicion.288
Civil forfeiture laws not only provide police a skewed financial motive for seizing property,
but the evidence indicates that civil forfeiture is far from helpful in decreasing criminal activity.
In a sample of one-hundred Drug Enforcement Administration cash seizures collected by the
Office of the Inspector General in 2017, zero evidence was found that these seizures contributed
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to a criminal investigation.289 Additionally, in 2015, New Mexico overhauled their civil forfeiture
legislation, prohibiting the practice. A study conducted by the Institute for Justice analyzed the
effect that this reform had on crime, ultimately finding no statistically significant rise in crime
rates.290 Moreover, while the federal government tracks forfeiture activity in great detail, there is
no measurement of whether anyone was charged with a crime in conjunction with each forfeiture.
This data, or lack thereof, gives the illusion that the police are actively fighting crime through
forfeiture collections, without actually being held accountable for crime reduction.291 In the end,
civil forfeiture allows police to collect money to fund future operations, resulting in more seizures
and more arrests, which again fills the pockets of police and government agencies.
The introduction of hot-spot policing has made it easier for police to justify their
discriminatory search and seizure practices. Historical patterns of racist law enforcement have
ensured that police officers have a tendency to think geographically when searching for crime—a
vast majority of asset seizures occur in low-income, minority communities. Hot-spot models, by
nature, justify and legitimize this tendency as necessary for effective law enforcement. As the
algorithms behind these models send police back to the same neighborhoods over and over again
as part of a vicious reaffirming cycle, police are able to justify not only searching for crime and
making arrests, but also forfeiting property based on the fact that an algorithm labeled the area as
high risk for crime. Paradoxically (and predictably), seizing assets from the least well off in society
does not discourage crime—rather, those affected by civil forfeiture are forced to find ways to
survive by any means necessary.292
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In the end, the propensity for predictive policing algorithms to perpetuate and justify over
policing Black communities—while strengthening perceptions of Black criminality—has made
these tools essential to the prison-industrial complex. Predictive models have become
institutionalized as part of the prison-industrial complex, functioning not to protect communities
or eliminate bias in policing, but instead supporting corporate interests and helping police reach
financial incentives. Predictive policing, it appears, has not revolutionized law enforcement—it
has merely expanded longstanding discriminatory practices that fill the pockets of the rich at the
expense of Black communities and Black Americans.
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Conclusion
Overall, we need bold change in our criminal justice system. A good first step
forward is to start treating prisoners as human beings, not profiting from their
incarceration. Our emphasis must be on rehabilitation, not incarceration and
longer prison sentences.293

-

Bernie Sanders

The 2020 murder of George Floyd—a killing in which the stomach-churning injustice of the
situation was released in video footage online—sparked perhaps the most widespread and well
sustained calls for racial equality since the Civil Rights Movement. Floyd’s tragic death, as well
as those of numerous other unarmed Black individuals is not the result of a few bad apples in the
police department. These events are not the [sole] result of overinflated police budgets or
undertrained police forces. Sadly, the mistreatment and murder of Black civilians by the police is
the predictable result of a criminal justice system plagued by a history of racial bias; a system that
is designed to punish the most at-risk populations rather to provide support; a system that is not
broken, but is in fact the result of a grossly misguided perception of justice that puts economic
interests before racial equality.
While this study paints a rather bleak picture of the United States criminal justice system,
this does not mean that systematic change is out of reach—laying out the structural issues rooted
in the system is an important first step towards finding meaningful solutions. With that said,
achieving structural change requires a fundamental shift in our approach to justice—one that
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recognizes the United States tortured racial history and uses resources to support marginalized
peoples and communities rather than punish them.
To start, states and the federal government must revisit the draconian drug laws and
sentencing policies enacted during the War on Drugs—laws and policies that continue to
disproportionately effect people of color. In recent years, there has been some effort on this front.
In 2012, Colorado became the first state to legalize the recreational use and sale of marijuana.
Today, a total of eighteen states and Washington, D.C. have followed suit, while a total of twentyseven states have decriminalized marijuana.294 In 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law
the Fair Sentencing Act, reducing the crack and powder cocaine sentencing disparity from 100:1
to 18:1, while also eliminating mandatory minimums for possession of crack cocaine.295 While
these changes indicate a step in the right direction, they have not gone nearly far enough. For one
thing, there is no reason that a sentencing disparity should exist at all between crack and powder
cocaine—two substances that are chemically identical. Moreover, tens of thousands of people
remain incarcerated for the possession and sale of marijuana, while private companies and states
now profit from the drug. All fifty states still have mandatory sentencing laws, including twentyeight states that still have some form of the barbaric three-strikes law.296 Across the nation, more
than five million people remain disenfranchised due to a prior felony charge.297
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The persistence of mandatory minimum sentences, strict drug laws and disenfranchisement
laws are all issues that disproportionately effect African Americans and contribute to the negative
perception of Black criminality. Therefore, the United States should move to eliminate these facets
of the criminal justice institution. To start, the supreme court and individual states should move to
completely legalize recreational marijuana—a drug that has shown to be less harmful to adults
than alcohol and tobacco, yet who’s consumption is still an incarcerable offense in many places.298
Individuals currently incarcerated on marijuana charges should be immediately released from
custody, and have their records wiped clean.299 In addition to loosening drug laws, the United
States must repeal the use of mandatory sentencing—an outdated and dehumanizing practice
serving only to keep people in prison for unnecessarily long periods of time. By eliminating these
laws, justices might have more discretionary power to hand down individualized sentencing
decisions, an essential step towards treating the accused as human beings rather than statistics.
Finally, the United States should move to eliminate disenfranchisement laws for released felons.
Once an individual has served their time in prison, they should not continue to be treated as a
second-class citizen—someone with no say in how the country is run or what policies are put in
place. Repealing the unjust disenfranchisement laws that serve as a roadblock for reintegration in
society is an important measure that will help to ensure all Americans have a say in the policies
and regulations that continue to affect their lives.
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Another initiative the United States must take is to remove financial interests from the
process of mass incarceration. Of course, disentangling the private interests of corporate giants
from the criminal justice system is not something that will happen overnight. There are, however,
practical steps that the federal and state governments can take to reduce financial motives related
to mass incarceration. For one, congress must take immediate action to outlaw the construction
and use of private prisons. Although eliminating private prisons will not eliminate mass
incarceration by itself (only about 10 percent of prisoners are currently held in private prisons),
removing private prisons will help to curb the economic interest of keeping these facilities at
maximum capacity, and the carceral corporations who have long profited on the exploitation of
primarily Black bodies will no longer have an interest in locking people away in their facilities.
Banning private prisons will have positive implications for those already incarcerated as well—
the cost-cutting strategies essential to the business model of private prisons greatly affect the safety
and quality of life for prisoners housed in these facilities. In some places, steps towards removing
private prisons have already taken place—in 2019, California state legislators voted to ban all
private prison contracts in the state.300
Along with banning the use of private prisons, states and the federal government must work
to remove civil forfeiture laws provide law enforcement unwarranted financial incentives to search
out crime, particularly in poor, African American communities. Funds collected through civil
forfeiture continue to fund the militarization of police forces, contributing to the abusive over
policing practices that have disproportionately affected Black communities for decades.
Eliminating civil forfeiture necessarily involves shutting down the federal equitable sharing
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program—a program which allows police forces to transfer seized property to the federal
government and receive up to 80 percent of the proceeds.301 Eliminating civil forfeiture as a means
for law enforcement agencies to profit will, in theory, create less incentive for police to target atrisk communities. Thus far, four states—Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico and North Carolina are
the only states to have enacted laws to abolish civil forfeiture.302
Another problem with the criminal justice system—the primary problem discussed in this
study—is the use of predictive police technology. On one hand, the use of predictive technology
by law enforcement is here to stay. Overall, technology across industries has greatly improved
human lives. The development of technology, particularly in the 21st century has led to massive
improvements in communication, healthcare, education, infrastructure, energy etc. In law
enforcement, technology has certainly improved the efficiency at which agencies use their
resources. The problem, however, lies in the fact that predictive policing technology uses
historically skewed data to make decisions regarding who to target for punishment—an extension
of the deeply misguided goals of the punishment bureaucracy. Moreover, as this technology
becomes increasingly engrained in policing tactics, and the desire to reduce crime stays high, it
becomes difficult to balance the pressures of combatting structural issues and keeping up with
progressive law enforcement tactics. Nonetheless, the fact that police technology is being used in
this manner has had drastic effects for communities of color, and has eroded vital trust between
law enforcement and the community—According to a poll conducted by PBS, approximately half
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of Black Americans have little or no confidence that police officers treat people with different skill
colors the same.303
The fact that law enforcement has relied on predictive algorithms to punish African
American communities does not mean that the technology is innately bad. In fact, if put to the
proper use, predictive policing models could serve to build trust between law enforcement and
Black communities and help correct the systematic issues that lead to poverty and crime in these
communities. By design, predictive policing models are effective at narrowing in on at-risk
communities and at-risk individuals for intervention. While this intervention is currently punitive
in nature, the government and law enforcement agencies could use these models to correct the
structural issues that contribute to the high-risk designation given to these areas and people. Instead
of providing funding to militarize police forces for the purpose of punitive enforcement, the
government and private donors should redirect funds to improve schools, foster employment
opportunities, provide rehabilitation programs and improve infrastructure. Moreover, police
should make a concentrated effort to connect with at risk communities with the purpose of reducing
tensions that have resulted from years of racist policies and practices. As part of this effort, law
enforcement absolutely must engage community members in discourse regarding how their
communities are to be policed—including welcoming public criticism and reform
recommendations, and providing full transparency with regard to any technology being used (i.e.,
hot-spot maps).
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In the end, restructuring the United States criminal justice system to reflect democratic and
egalitarian ideals rather than reflecting financial interests is not a change that will occur overnight.
In fact, achieving long-term solutions will necessarily conflict with our current political culture,
where politicians under term limits face pressures to address public concerns—often through shortterm strategies (i.e., being tough on crime) that appear to be initially successful in combatting
issues such as crime. As a result, the achievement of long-term solutions will require years of
dedication by lawmakers, law enforcement agencies and the general public to come to fruition. It
is my belief, however, that ostensible change for those most effected by the rise and evolution of
the carceral state is attainable—change that will create a better and more equitable United States
of America.
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